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Logisticians at NARF's (Naval Air Rework Facilities) presently rely on the
qualitative judgment of skilled P & E's (Planners and Estimaters) to determine when
depot level maintenance is required on P-3 aircraft. This study focuses on quantifying
the management problem of deciding which P-3's to recommend for rework delays
under the Navy's ASPA (Aircraft Service Period Adjustment) program. Inspection
consistency, precise managerial auditing, and computer-based trend analysis are
prospective attributes of a properly tested and instituted quantitative ASPA evaluation.
The engineering basis and the economic realities of the P & E's decision are addressed.
By exploring current management science methodologies, a practical model patterned
after ASPA evaluation methods being tested at NARF Norfolk and at Army
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Evaluating an aircraft's overall material condition is like giving a physical
examination to a patient. The diagnostic skills of an experienced medical doctor
include historical research, visual inspection, physical manipulation, simplified testing,
and symptomatic analysis. Once a physical examination is completed, the medical
doctor may request additional laboratory tests or exploratory surgery to complete his
or her diagnosis.
The diagnostic methods of a XARF (Naval Aircraft Rework Facility) P & E
(Planner and Estimator) are not unlike those of a medical doctor. Armed with an
abundance of maintenance experience on a particular type of aircraft, a P & E searches
the maintenance action files for trends which usually precede major deterioration that
is best repaired at a NARF. Next the P & E climbs aboard the aircraft and notes
telltale signs of damage on exterior surfaces and inside accessible cavities. Excessive
leaks, warped surfaces, scorched wires, popped rivets, and markings of improper
maintenance or damage are noted. P & E's wipe film and dust from metal surfaces and
with the aide of a strong light or magnifying glass, carefully search for growing cracks
or corrosion. A P & E may also test suspicious surfaces with the tap of a coin, a stick
of adhesive tape, or the drop of liquid penetrants. However, even the P & E is unable
to detect or predict all major damage in an aircraft.
The most important skill of a person trained at diagnosing problems is knowing
where to look for exterior signals of internal damage. Internal damage is the most
insidious because it cannot be detected and corrected by the typical maintenance
worker. However, when the P & E suspects internal damage, he can request industrial
testing to verify his suspicion.
If all else fails, most P & E's have developed an intuitive sixth sense about the
overall deterioration level of an aircraft. After years of estimating deterioration from
exterior symptoms and comparing estimates to dismantled interiors, P & E's have
become experts at deciding which aircraft need rework and which aircraft can afford to
stay in the Heet longer. These evaluations are forwarded through the NARF
management to NALC (Naval Air Logistics Command).
In 1972, Lewis Ncri and Harold Law developed a quantitative "profile index" to
help depot management decide which aircraft should be admitted to rework at Corpus
Christi Army Depot [Ref. 1: p. 335]. In 1985, Dale McPherson at NARF Norfolk
altered the Army's model to fit the specific problems of A-6 aircraft [Ref 2: p. 1].
Until that time. N'ARF logisticians had relied primarily on the qualitative judgement of
P & E's with the assistance of experienced aeronautical engineers as their decision
basis.
B. THE PROBLEM
The key problem becomes evident when one attempts to segregate the
combination of aircraft defects which perpetrated the P & E's recommendation. Using
N'eri and Law's original research and McPherson's lessons learned as a model, this
study attempts to formulate a quantitative basis to evaluate P-3 aircraft for depot
rework. In this study the reader may assume that a P-3 refers to all models and
updates of the four-engined turboprop aircraft built by Lockheed-California Company
for the purpose of antisubmarine and antisurface naval warfare.
C. SCOPE AND APPROACH
The scope of this thesis is limited to describing the P & E's job and the
environment where he works. As a means of providing more consistent evaluations,
more productive feedback, and a technical audit trail, a quantitative model simulating
the P & E's decision criteria is provided in this study. Every decision that P & E's
make while inspecting a P-3 will not be represented. However, the proposed model
does include many of the more important decisions that P & E's make based on their
view of how the aircraft being inspected compares in deterioration levels to those that
P & Es have observed on other P-3's. The importance of one material discrepancy
over another is reflected in the revised inspection form's implicit weights. However,
this model does not include a single valued threshold which could serve as a criterion
for management's decision to curtail a P-3's current OSP (Operational Service Period).
The approach used in this study follows Xeri and Law's technique for cost
elTective depot level management. First, expert opinion was solicited from NARF P &
E's. After discussing alternative models, the group at NARF Alameda agreed that the
Army method most closely resembled the P-3 evaluation problem. Selection of leading
indicators or critical inspection areas was next decided upon. Pairwise comparisons
were used to rank leading indicators. Next the model of Neri and Law was used for
weighting inspection areas relative to their importance to the final evaluation. Their
model is based on subdividing the area under an hyperbolic curve to provide the
relative influence that a leading indicator contributed to the total problem. Finally,
each leading indicators weight was divided into levels of deterioration to reflect
conditions that a P & E can diflerentiate while inspecting a P-3. The end result is an
experimental ASPA evaluation form which is ready for testing and comparing with the
results of the present ASPA evaluation form in Appendix B.
D. PREVIEW
Chapter If addresses the engineering basis of the P & E's decision from first
procurement of the P-3 to contemporary considerations. Chapter III explains the
economic realities of P-3 rework which complicate the P & E's decision. Chapter IV
suggests quantitative approaches to modeling the P & E's decision process. Chapter V
proposes a quantitative approach for the ASPA Evaluation. Chapter VI provides a
summary, conclusions, and recommendations. Appendices display two examples of
evaluation forms devised to record the P & E's impressions, to assist the P & E in
making the appropriate overall decision, and to communicate this decision to safety
engineers at the NARF.
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II. PROCURING AIRCRAFT RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY
A. SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
Operational availability estimates in naval planning documents played an
important role in the decision to procure the P-3 from Lockheed-California Company.
Operational availability is defined as the probability that a system or component is in
an operable state at the start of a mission when called for at an unknown (random)
point in time under stated conditions in an operational environment. Availability is a
function of reliability, maintainability
,
and Oeet support and is maximized by the
balanced tradeolTs of these parameters during the design and development process.
[Ref. 3: p. 65]
Reliability is defined as ". . . the probability that a system or device will perform
without failure under given conditions for a specified period of time " [Ref 4: p. 305].
Maintainability, like reliability, is an inherent characteristic of system or product
design. It pertains to the ease, accuracy, safety, and economy in the performance
of maintenance actions. [Ref 3: p. 15]'
R & M (reliability and maintainability) are designed and built into a major weapon
system by the manufacturer. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the important
role that R & M play in the acquisition process and their relationship to the logistics
support of a major weapon system such as the P-3.
The acquisition process of a major weapon system is delineated in the Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-109 and the 5000 series Department of Defense
Directives. The "cradle to grave" poHcies in A-109 begin with the recognition of a
mission need.
1. Concept Exploration Phase
When the mission need calls for a naval aviation concept, the Naval Air
Systems Command appoints a PM (Program Manager) to produce a System Concept
Paper. The Assistant Commander for Logistics and Fleet Support (AIR-04) works
with the PM in recommending logistics requirements for the new system. Design
proposals to satisfy these requirements are solicited from industrial contractors with
specific qualifications and strengths in a desired technology. Alternative concepts from
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competing responsive and responsible contractors are evaluated. Ideas from
universities, federal contract research centers, or Na\7 Research and Development
Laboratories are combined with historical operating and support data to provide a
preliminar\' R cfe M evaluation of each contractor's concept alternative. The product
of this Concept Exploration phase includes Milestone Review Documentation and a
preferred concept which is submitted to the Joint Requirements and Management
Board (JRMB) and the Logistics Review Board (LRB), among others, for review.
2. Demonstration and Validation Phase
If the Secretary' of Defense approves the preferred concept alternative, the
weapon system proceeds to the Demonstration and Validation phase. In this phase,
the Program Office translates environmental operating conditions into contractual
requirements so they can be included in design solicitations.
An Integrated Logistic Support Plan is developed by the contractor to
conform to operating conditions. In this document the contractor identifies plans for
implementing the system's maintenance and support concept. Goals for attaining
acceptable R & M tradeoffs between the best technology support concept and available
resources are decided. Also the new system's support funding profile is compared with
similar recent programs.
3. Full Scale Development Phase
Once the Demonstration and Validation Milestone Review Documentation is
approved, the program enters the Full Scale Development Phase. The Department of
Defense Directive 5000.4 issued guidance in July of 1980 to establish a series of
reliability goals and thresholds that the PM must enforce. This guidance recognizes
that reliability of the weapon system is a basic function of the design and that post-
design fixes are an inefficient method for achieving reliability goals.
Successful techniques used by many contractors in the Full Scale
Development Phase to attain reliability goals are FVIEA {failure mode effects analysis),
apportionment of reliability requirements, parts control and standardization, design
simplicity, redundancy, and increased safety margins. [Ref 5: p. 4-59]. However, one
of the best ways of improving the reliability of aircraft components involves
cooperation between the aircraft designer, specialist engineers, and maintenance
personnel who have had experience with the same or similar components.
The design elTort starts with searching for the best similar equipment alreadv in
service, sxrutinizing operational experience regarding mean time between failures,
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mean time between unscheduled removals, major failure modes, and potential
improvements [Ref. 6: p. 24J.
The Full Scale Development phase also includes more specific details about
maintainability. Concern in this phase is with accessability, interchangeability of like
components, standard parts, standard tools, corrosion control, handling ease, and built-
in test equipment. An output of this phase is the Integrated Logistics Support Plan.
The Integrated Logistics Support Plan attempts to minimize logistics
requirements throughout design by providing feedback during development. Logistics
risks, the range and depth of logistics requirements, and supportability of the hardware
are reviewed in the Logistics Support Analysis (LSA).
Several important documents are the output of LSA. One of the more
important is the Maintenance Plan (MP). The MP includes level of repair analysis,
reliability-centered maintenance analysis and failure mode effects analysis. RCM
(Reliability Centered Maintenance) analysis is directed at a fairly small number of
significant items - those whose failure might have safety or major economic
consequences. These items are subjected to intensive study, first to classify them
according to their failure consequences and then to determine whether there is some
form of maintenance protection against these consequences. This process has been
adopted by all major airlines and military' services. Xowlan and Heap, in their book,
Reliability-Centered Maintenance [Ref 7], developed this process first for the airline
industry. Since then it has been extended in the Navy to fieet aircraft and shipboard
systems.
The Phased Support Plan is an offshoot of the MP and identifies maintenance
support responsibilities during the transition of the aircraft from the vendor to the
militar}' owner. It includes responsibilities for all three levels of maintenance activities,
i.e. organization, intermediate, and depot level. The MIR (Master Index of
Repairables) is another by-product of the MP. The MIR lists all of a weapon systems
repairable components and projects a five year workload to be accomplished on each
component by all levels of maintenance.
Of course, the LSA is carefully integrated with performance parameters to
assure compatibility while optimizing the whole weapon system. Military Standard
449A [Ref 8] describes this weapon system engineering as the integration of
performance, reliability, maintainability, safety, surviveability, and human factors into
the total engineering effort.
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When the Full Scale Development milestone review documentation is
completed, final design reviews determine the adequacy of" contractor and Na\T eflbrts
to achieve design objectives. Usually participants are qualified as design specialists in
the areas of reliability, maintainability, safety, and logistic supportability and work for
the Naval Air Development Center. The major reviews conducted during systems
development include a preliniinary design review, a critical design review, a design
certification review, a functional and physical configuration audit, a first-article
configuration inspection, and a pre-production reliabihty design review.
4. Production Phase
Financial and progress reviews by the JRMB and LRB plus approval by the
Secretary of Defense are required before the program can continue into the final phase
of the acquisition process known as Full Scale Production. The identification and
correction of problems in product quaUty are critical during the production phase. The
aerospace industry identifies problems by performing many quality assurance
inspections after each manufacturing step.
B. PRODUCTION QUALITY
Airframe manufacturers use quality control inspections to correct problems
associated with work hardening corrosion, stress corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement,
and fracture mechanics. [Ref 9: p. 5] At present sophisticated x-radiation. ultrasonics,
eddy current, and fracture mechanics techniques are used as normal procedures during
structural tests, both on complete airframes and on components.
1. Fracture Mechanics
The field of fracture mechanics is used extensively to evaluate material
characteristics and to quantify quality assurance results along lines similar to those
used as safety measures for space-vehicle pressure vessels. The F-15 procurement
program used fracture-mechanics analysis during its initial production stage. The most
expensive fracture-control plan to date is used in the B-1 bomber's quality assurance
program. [Ref 10: pp. 10-18]
In order to insure this safety it has to be predicted how fast cracks will grow and
how fast the residual strength will decrease: Vlakine these predictions and
developing prediction metlTods are the objects of fracture mechanics [Ref 9: p. 7].
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The presence of Haws too niiniscule to be reliably detected in the nianuiactured
material is assumed in fracture mechanics. A fracture-control Inspection plan is
intended to circumvent catastrophic failures from production or service-induced flaws
that are usually not found by current quality assurance procedures.
Developing designs which have in-process quality controls like fracture
mechanics are beneficial, but are cost prohibitive for lower performance aircraft like the
P-3. Therefore, airframe quality may be degraded by changes in tooling, processing,
and workflow. However, without utilizing fracture mechanics in updated versions of
the P-3, future problems could occur. For example, designers are aware of the less
desirable fracture characteristics of high strength materials, but they may choose them
over a more fracture resistant material due to a requirement to attain specific aircraft
performance such as fuel economy due to harder material's lighter weight. A flawless
structure is more difTicult to manufacture in harder materials that need more accurate
machining and processing techniques. In addition, quality-assurance methods often are
inadequate for reliable detection of the small flaw sizes that are significant in these
lower tolerance materials. [Ref. 10: p. 14]
One of the most important, yet difficult elements of an eflective fracture-
control plan is the accurate estimation of an airframe's service life [Ref 10: p. 39]. In
particular, current procedures of P-3 service-life estimation produce only a partial
characterization of service life due to limitations in a coherent database. Essentially,
service-life for P-3's must be derived from theoretical reliability computations based on
probability distributions.
2. Mathematical Predictions
Mathematical theories on the subject of reliability provide a choice for the
probability distribution of component failures and assumptions for the independence of
failures. Many relationships between failure rates and component life have been
theorized for the purpose of modeling observed samples. A popular, easy to
understand relationship which is often assumed is known as the bathtub curve. The
bathtub curve as depicted in Figure 2.1 attempts to describe the mean failure rate of a
component over its Ufetime. During the early life, a high rate is assumed. This rate
drops off rapidly, however, and there is a long period having a constant failure rate.
Finally, a rise in the rate is expected as the component "wears out". The exponential
probability distribution is typically associated with the fiat part of the bathtub curve.














Figure 2.1 Failure Rate versus Age of Components.
The service life estimation of exposed structures on a P-3 is complicated by
the variety of environments encountered by P-3's. The long distances travelled on each
mission, the variety of landing locations it operates from overseas, and the isolated
application of doubler patches to repair individual airframe damage reduces crack,
prediction accuracy. For instance, when computing crack propagation on a P-3's
fuselage, unpredictable environmental factors such as temperature and the presence of
humidity, water, fuels, or other chemicals must be considered, in addition to
determining the load on sections of an individual fuselage. MILSTD 781C [Ref 11]
recommends that the exponential distribution be used for most reliability design
qualification and production acceptance tests including those for the P-3.
3. Aircraft Acceptance
Military Standard 781C [Ref 11] has set levels which it uses for production
acceptance testing. These acceptance tests attempt to insure that the manufacturer
achieves the reliability goals specified in the production contract. However, like pre-
production qualification tests and initial operational test and evaluation, production
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acceptance tests should be conducted by government or contract personnel who are
independent of the producing contractor. This is an added measure to account for
conflicting interests and to insure that the NavT gets what it contracted for.
The Program Manager must realize that the contractor is obligated to his
shareholders to develop a piece of equipment at the least expense and at the lowest
acceptable reliability. Under fixed price acquisitions the contractor must reduce costs
to increase his profit. Reliability can become a tradeolT victim if it is not clearly
monitored. The PM must not forget the contractor's interest in the support of the
system being produced because "The contractor also has an eye on the downstream
spare parts market, which a production system represents. Any increases in reliability
would actually be counter productive to participation in this future market."
[Ref. 12: p. 9] Only the contractor's reputation is at risk if the operational failure rate is
substantially lower than the theoretical. To transfer more risk to the contractor and
nurture reliability growth, product warranties may be necessary in the early phases of
development. Warranties typically provide the NavT protection against manufacturing
or design defects for a specified period of time. Warranted fixes are repaired at cost to
the Navy.
4. Product Improvement
Any new component has the possibihty of unanticipated failure. However,
serious unanticipated failures should motivate some sort of product improvement.
MILSTD 2173 specifies that the logic diagram in Figure 2.2 be used to justify
suspected product improvements [Ref 11: p. 96]. Problem components are redesigned
at great expense. Once designed and tested, the operating fleet is then modified as
quickly as possible with the design fix. "Product Improvement, based on identification
of the actual reliability characteristics of each item through age exploration, is part of
the normal development cycle of all complex equipment" [Ref 7: p. XX]. The design
and maintenance organizations should work together to diagnose the failed mechanism.
because this information is necessary for product improvement.
Information necessar>' to substantiate Product Improvement is found in the
Navy's Maintenance and Material Management (3-M) system's Maintenance Data
Collection System (MDCS). The MDCS data base is also useful for computing
equipment reUability, maintainability, and availability factors. [Ref 13: p. 2].
In 1967 the Xav>' established a P-3C Weapon System reliability goal of ninety







*«e »«eSENT OR "ROPO3E0 NEW
'BEVENTTve MEASURES £FF=crTVE
IN AWOIOINQ SUCH f*H.URES7
rFS '
IS THE REVUININa TECHnOLOGICAU-T











OOES THE f^AiLURE INVOLVE
^Q 1 IS THE COST Of BRCVENTIVEI 40
CONSEQUENCES?







ARE THERE SRECiFlC COSTS
wMiCH MIGHT 3E cUminaTEO SY
onOOUCT iMPKOVEMENr?
1"t '
s rHERE » HIGH ->»oaA8)un',
wrrvi EXSTING TECHNOLOGY,
THAT iN ATTHM^ AT P«O0UCT





OOES AN ECONOMIC TPAOEOFF










Figure 2.2 Logic Diagram for Product Improvement Justification.
Capable aircraft and completing a normal twelve-hour antisubmarine warfare mission
operating all weapon sensors. Therefore, a continuous comparison of actual versus
required reliability was necessary throughout the program. Lockheed management's
reliability control areas included reliability analysis, design surveillance and review, test
planning and monitoring, supplier reliability controls, failure analysis and corrective
action, data processing, reliability demonstration, reliability measurement, and
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reporting of reliability program status. Lockheed also prepared a reliability study for
the P-3C weapon system as a result of the increase to a 90"/'o mission goal. Subsystem
design concepts were subsequently changed to improve any reliabilities which were
below this goal. [Ref. 13: p. 4]
"In most cases, the greater the reliabiUty achieved the greater the development
and acquisition cost and the less the maintenance and support cost." [Ref. 14: p. 3]
This Life Cycle Cost approach may explain the P-3 Program Manager's rationale for
insisting on reliability growth in the P-3 Reliability Engineering Program Plan.
Maintenance factors such as modularization, accessibility, and fault-isolation were also
intended to lower life cycle costs. While reliability in many subsystems did improve,
the acquisition cost increased by several million dollars. This cost tradeofTis contested
even today by Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman.
C. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the problem of R & M is predicting which aircraft parts are most
susceptible to failure and how and when they can be expected to fail.
The complexity of modern equipment makes it impossible to predict with any
degree or accuracy when each part or each assembly is likely to fail. For this
.
reason it is generally more productive to focus on those reliability characteristics
that can be determined from the available information than to attempt to
estimate failure behavior that will not be known until the equipment enters
service. [Ref. 7: p. 141]
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III. DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE
A. INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of RC.M (Reliability Centered Maintenance) is to ". . . maintain,
at minimum cost, the operating reUability and safety levels that were originally
designed into the equipment " [Ref 15; p. 26]. The use of RC.M analysis in the
procurement cycle affects the way that depot le\el maintenance is performed and
scheduled once an aircraft is deployed. By utilizing the wisdom of RCM and its
emphasis on NDI (non-destructive inspection), it is possible to adjust an aircraft's
service period to an optimal balance of safety and economy. However, before
attempting to estimate the optimal service cycle of the P-3 aircraft, we should
understand the activities of a rework facihty, the Navy's application of RCM, the
practical application of NDI, and the economic constraints involved.
B. NARF ACTIVITIES
According to the Chief of Naval Operation's Instruction (OPNAVINST) 4790.2C
[Ref 16: p. 3-1], the depot level of maintenance ensures the flying integrity of airframes
and associated systems during subsequent operational service periods. Depot level
maintenance refers to major rework or rebuilding of components or assembUes
performed at a NARF. Depot level maintenance may also include manufacturing,
modifying, testing, or reclaiming salvageable parts. This upper level of maintenance
supports organizational level maintenance by providing sophisticated technical and
engineering assistance, calibration, age exploration, and SDLM (Standard Depot Level
xMaintenance) when needed. However, the primary job of the NARF is SDLM.
The requirements for SDLM as mandated in OPNAVINST 4790.2C [Ref 16: p.
10-2] are:
. . . based on systematic engineering^ analvsis of airframe, svstem and component
design, operational performance, and reUabilitv and maintainabihtv data. The
effectiveness of SDLM requirements is monitored and evaluated oh a continuous
basis through the use of supporting statistical and engineering analvsis programs.
The AnalytTcal Maintenance Program (AMP) is the primary authority for tne
technical validity of SDLM.
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In OPNAVINST 311U.11Q [Ref. 17: p. t-7], a SDLM is defined as ". . . rework
performed at a militar\' rework facility or conmiercial contractor's facility at specific
intervals during the service life of an aircraft." The intervals are determined by
engineering analysis and are based on operating service months and flight hour
accumulation. If no adjustments are required, the newest P-3C aircraft is required to
receive SDLM every sixty months. By the time the third SDLM is performed, the
service interval is shortened to fifty months. Four additional SDLM's are required at
forty month intervals until the total operational service life is achieved. This is 330
months according to current CNO guidance.
The scope of SDLM to be performed at a NARF is controlled by specifications
which are published by the CFA (Cognizant Field Activity). For the P-3, the CFA is
NARF Alameda. However, the CFA does not have the authority to remove or alter
the operating restrictions or specified service life limitations. This authority remains
with the Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command as explained in NAVAIR
Instruction 5400. I4C [Ref 18: p. 3].
The Naval Aviation Logistics Command manages the scheduling of aircraft
starting SDLM. Once an aircraft starts SDLM, a comprehensive E & E (examination
and evaluation) checks the operation of an aircraft's systems. Afterward, the fuel and
oxygen systems are drained and the engine and fuel cells are preserved. The second
stage of E &. E documents discrepancies with regard to airframe condition and
integrity. Many component parts such as engines and avionics are removed and
reworked separately. [Ref 19: p. 18]
The third stage of SDLM involves stripping paint from the airframe 's exposed
surfaces to check for corrosion. The corrosion found is subsequently eliminated and
the airframe is treated with corrosion resistant chemicals. A plant E & E (Estimator &
Evaluator) inspects for hidden corrosion, cracks, or unusual wear. "Where necessary
for further inspection, rivets are removed and the skin peeled back" [Ref 20: p. 27].
The fourth stage of SDLM consists of metal repair, structural modification, and
change kit installation. Component parts are replaced and checked for proper
operation. The airframe is then painted with primer. Application of the final coat of
paint completes the fourth stage. [Ref 19: p. 18]
The final stage of SDLM requires the aircraft to be weighed and balanced with
dr\' fuel tanks. After weighing the aircraft, the landing gear is drop-checked, the fuel
cells are filled and checked for leaks, and the engines are tuned up. The aircraft is
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ready for its functional-check flight after all systems become operational on the
ground. Check flight discrepancies are repaired following the flight. If the aircraft
passes the final inspection, it is ready for issue to the fleet. [Ref 19: p. 18]
C. ANALYTICAL MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
1. Background
The Analytical Maintenance Program was adopted by the Navy in 1974. The
trial phase of this program was evaluated in Patrol Squadron 40 based at Naval Air
Station MofTett Field, California in August 1973. Lockheed-California Company was
contracted to tailor United Airlines' proven RCM logic to the P-3's low-level patrol
mission and harsh operating environment. The Lockheed analysis group led by Frank
H. Connell applied the L-1011 TriStar Maintenance Program to all forty-five P-3
squadrons by March 1975. The Depot Level Maintenance Program was completed at
NARF Alameda in July 1975. [Ref 21: p. 12]
2. RCM Logic
Lockheed's analysis group selected SSI's (structurally significant items) on the
P-3 and developed the military's first structural sampling inspection program. Each of
the SSI's was determined ". . . based on logical step-by-step, 'yes, no' decision
"diagrams" which consider the efTect on the aircraft if the part should fail " [Ref 22: p.
11]. The first two questions in Figure 3.1 [Ref. 21: p. 13], address the relative efTect of
flight safety if a component fails. The last two questions consider the efTect of failure
on operational performance and economics. These questions are designed so that vital
elements are not disregarded and items are treated equally. From the 81 systems on
the P-3. the team determined that 406 items were structurally significant [Ref 21: p.
12].
The result of the RCM logic process is the separation of SSI's into three
defined categories:
• Hard Time Limit - An item which demonstrates a predictable reliabilitv
relationship between age and degradation. At a conservative age, these items
are replaced.
• On Condition - An item which requires a scheduled inspection or test to
determine degradation and impending failure.
• Condition Monitoring - An item requirine no scheduled inspections because it
can be checked visuallv, monitored ov instruments, or surveved from data.
[Ref 23: p. 13]
'
By separating the SSI's into these categories, several former assumptions
about maintenance inspections are refuted. One long held assumption is that
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1. Is there a "Condition After
Failure" that has a direct,
adverse efTect on operating
safety?
NO ; YES
2. Is there a function hidden
from the flight crew that has
a potential adverse effect on
operating safety?
NO ; YES—
3.1s a reduction in resistance
to failure detectable by in-place
maintenance or unit test?
NO ; YES





No scheduled task is required.
-^ Requires a scheduled maintenance
action, or design change if no
action can be identified.
-^ Requires a scheduled maintenance
action, usually an operational
check.
4 Requires a scheduled maintenance
action, usually a periodic
inspection.
-^ Requires a scheduled maintenance
action, usually fixed-frequency
replacement.
Figure 3.1 Decision Tree Logic Diagram: The Basis of P-3 Maintenance.
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increasing maintenance reduces failures. A U. S. Air Force analysis demonstrated that
40% of the work required to return a statistically significant sample of F-4's to
operational status was directly attributed to failures caused by previous maintenance
[Ref 23: p. 14]. A XavT study concluded ". . . that an aircraft will be statistically less
reliable and will require more unscheduled lower level maintenance after depot
maintenance than before" [Ref 20: p. F-4].
A second assumption was that all of an aircraft's parts need to be overhauled
or thev will fail with aee. However,
An analvsis of hundreds of aircraft components bv commercial airlines and
(other) aircraft reveals that all go throush a burn-In stage and a stage of low
probabilitv of failure over some period of operation. Verv few components reach
the wearout stage in their normal operating lives. . . . (Fo'r examplej United
Airlines intensix^elv studied 140 aircraft components from all aircraft tvnes in
their fleet. Ninetv-four percent were found to have no need for a scheduled time
limit for the accomplishment of maintenance actions. Corroboration of this is
seen in the statistics developed by Lockheed on the S-3 (aircraft). [Ref 20: p. 43]
3. P-3 Experience
The success of the Analytical Maintenance Program prompted the CNO to
incorporate the RCM philosophy in all front-line aircraft starting in 1973. [Ref 24: p.
18] By revising the maintenance program to include RCM logic, Patrol Squadron 40's
maintenance department reduced the on-condition maintenance tasks from 90.5°'o of
all maintenance tasks to 46.8% and reduced the hard time replacements from 9.5% of
all maintenance tasks to 6.5% [Ref 21: p. 16]. The use of RCM procedures saved the
NARF at Alameda 2.000 man-hours per P-3, totalling S3.41 million in fiscal year 1976.
VIore importantly the RCM procedures almost doubled the availability of new P-3's by
extending the average depot rework interval from 34 to 60 months.
D. AIRCRAFT EVALUATION
Even though the Navy has accepted RCM logic as a basis for its Analytical
Maintenance Program, the problem of evaluatiiig aircraft requiring SDLM still needs
resolution. Clearly, identification of structurally significant items or zones is a vital
prerequisite to airframe inspections. However, such items tend to be difficult to
identify since:
The generic term SSI (structurallv significant item) is used to denote each specific
structural region that requires scheduled maintenance to guard against the
fracture of a^significant member. This region mav be delmed as a site that
includes a nuniber of structural elements, . . . the significant member itself, or . .
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. a particular resion on the member that is the best indicator of its condition.
[Ret. 7: p. S4] ^
Most of an airframe is evaluated by on-condition inspections of the regions
identified as best or leading indicators of a member's condition. However, the primary'
intent of these inspections is to find and repair corrosion, fatigue, and accidental
damage as early as possible to preclude the expensive and arduous task of replacing
failed structural members. [Ref 7: p. 84]
E. INSPECTIONS
1. Inspection Policy
The frequency of inspecting specific zones at the depot is outlined in the
Analytical Maintenance Program Standard Depot Level Maintenance Specification: i\avy
Model P-3 and Derivative Series Aircraft (31 Vlarch 1986) published by direction of the
Commander, Xaval Air Systems Command. This specification contains requirements
to inspect certain zones 100% of the time and other zones on 20% of the sample
aircraft. Many inspection tasks are required on Lead-the-Fleet aircraft as well as
aircraft which have exceeded 75*'/o of the Fatigue Life Index. ^ Some tasks are
accompUshed when the opportunity arises such as the removal of a damaged fuel
bladder, which allows an inspector access to internal wing planks.
2. Opportunity Inspection
Another form of opportunity inspection occurs when corrosion is detected.
When corrosion is found or suspected and the extent is undetermined ". . . the
adjacent structure shall be disassembled, i.e., the skin shall be peeled back, fittings . . .
removed to the extent required " [Ref 25: p. 2-6].
Inspections by highly skilled personnel often result in further opportunity
inspections during the initial disassembly process when a P-3 enters SDLM. E & E
(Examiner & Evaluator) personnel note
. . . cracks, corrosion, damaged controls, worn hinees, attach fittings, bearings,
bushings and bolts, distortion and elongation of bolt holes, and any signs that
may lead to disassembly to a greater depth . . . [Ref 25; p. 2-34].
The Fatigue Life Index is a product of statistical analysis of accelerometer
readings which indicate the structural fatigue consumption of an aircraft. Naval Air
Development Center Report 13920-1 disseminates an estimate for each aircraft
quarterly to cognizant NARF's.
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The L: &. n will also inspect zones specifically requested by the deliven.' activity,
intrinsically determined from the aircraft's service record, or historically deteriorated
from past experience.
3. Non-Destructive Inspection
If the E & E suspects deterioration. NDI (non-destructive inspection) methods
are often required to verify material condition. The NDI methods used most often are
eddy current, fluorescent penetrant, magnetic particle, radiographic, and ultrasonic in
accordance with MIL-STD-271 [Ref 25: p. 2-10]. Determination of the best method to
use is based on accessibiUty to structural surfaces and the availabiUty of appropriate
tools.
Eddy current NDI is used for finding inclusions and cracks near the surface of
electrically conducting structural members. For example, SSI's on the P-3 requiring
eddy current NDI are the upper engine nacelle attach plates and the centroid riser
cavity radii in the wing [Ref 25: p. 2-53].
Fluorescent penetrant is the most commonly recommended NDI method in
the NAVAIR P-3 SDLM Specification. The universal application of fiuorescent
penetrant to clean nonabsorbent material is limited only by accessibility. Surface
cracks on forged or machined SSI's such as the problematic forward spar cap
attachment fittings and the nose landing gear steering housing are found using
fluorescent penetrants.
Magnetic particle NDI is used to highhght surface and subsurface flaws.
Ferrous materials can be inspected by first magnetizing them. SSI's like the dorsal fin
angle attachment clips or the engine nacelle's longeron attachment's specified in the
NAVAIR P-3 SDLM Specification are inspected using magnetic particles.
Application of x-ray NDI is widely used and respected for detecting interior
distortions, cracks, and clearances between parts. This method of NDI is used to
inspect welds for cracks on the P-3's oil cooler augmenter as well as other areas. X-
rays can also verify the presence of corrosion. [Ref 25: p. 2-65]
Ultrasonic NDI is another means of detecting interior flaws. A highly trained
inspector can ultrasonically detect a crack deep within the P-3's nose landing steering
collar or a horizontal stabilizer skin plank [Ref 25: p. 2-58]. Ultrasonics can also be
used to measure the degree of corrosion present on aircraft surfaces.
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F. ECONOMICS
NDI is certainly helpful as an additional inspection, but depot management must
balance the total cost of inspection and ultimately the total cost of SDLM against the



















Figure 3.2 Cost Tradeoffs for Aircraft Availability.
The key to these costs is material condition. One might further hypothesize that
material condition permitting, a P-3 can remain in operational service until inspections
indicate there is an economic need to induct the aircraft into SDL.M. The
hypothesized relationship between SDLM costs and the lack of aircraft availability due
to SDLM (pipeline) costs is illustrated in Figure 3.2 .
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The Na\Ts ASPA (Aircraft Service Period Adjustment) Program attempts to
minimize the P-3s total cost (Life Cycle Cost) while maximizing the number of aircraft
available for operations in the licet. The ultimate goal of the ASPA program is to seek
the lowest point on the total cost curve in Figure 3.2 which corresponds to the most
cost eflective mi.x of pipeline aircraft and SDLM resources. Hitch and VlcKean in
their book. The Economics of Defense in [he Xuclear Age, summarized proposals similar
to the economic eoals of ASPA when thev wrote.
Vlilitarv choice can be a verv subtle and complex matter . . . No simple formal
model of choice is likelv to be stifiicient for a satisfactorv analvsis of most real
militar}' problems. But' it is often enlightening to formufate pa'rts of the problem
of choice in economic terms, that is, in terms^of discovering the most elective
uses of limited resources. [Ref. 27: p. 361]
The relationship between the ASPA program and SDLM resources is not clear
due to the complex nature of scheduling aircraft for SDLM, production control,
component availability, non-SDLM rework, contractor dependability, labor shortages,
and funding constraints at the NARF. An example of how difficult it is to maximize
the economic capacity of a NARF occurred in 1973. Logistics Management Institute
ended its year-long study by recommending that further studies on NARF economies
of scale be discontinued due to unpredictable economic factors. [Ref. 28: pp. 27-29]
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IV. QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES
A. ASPA(AIRCRAFT SERVICE PERIOD ADJUSTMENT)
OPNAV Instruction 3110.11Q [Ref. 17: p. E-6\ states that aircraft in the ASPA
program (which includes most fleet aircraft) will remain within the manufacturer's
recommended flight hour and structural fatigue life limitations. This authorized
operating service life is divided into varying length's of OSP's (operational service
periods) based on the accumulated flight hours, operating service months in the fleet,
or operating months per flight hours. Aircraft which "pass" the ASPA program's
required inspection will have their OSP end date extended for twelve months. Aircraft
which "fail" ASPA and are not inducted into SDLM within 90 days of their OSP end
date will be flown to the XARF and grounded. The controlling custodian may make
exceptions on a case by case basis, but generally the ASPA inspection results determine
what year a specific P-3 will enter SDLM.
P-3 Local Engineering Specification GEN/AL 12-9-0110 found in Appendix A of
this thesis, contains an ASPA Inspection Results Form which Usts 109 inspection tasks.
This list is an attempt to assist the P & E and the CFA who evaluate w^hether a
particular P-3 is deteriorated enough to receive the most economical SDLM possible.
However, when inspection forms are reviewed and NARF management attempts to
reproduce the P & E's decision logic for passing one aircraft and failing another, the
inspection forms may become inadequate. The same is true when one tries to rank
P-3's and other naval aircraft by material condition. The outcome is ambiguous and
highly subjective. [Ref 29: p. 39]
CFA engineers and P & E's interviewed by Dale McPherson, A-6 Air Vehicle
Engineering Branch Head at NARF Norfolk, agreed that a quantitative method of
evaluating aircraft inspected for ASPA might be both desirable and possible. Further,
a quantitative method would presumably give the CFA a workable index to control an
entire community of aircraft such as the P-3. However, all personnel interviewed were
concerned that a quantitative inspection form which was biased toward economics
might slight the importance of critical safety defects. For this reason, an ASPA
evaluation based on estimated man-hours to repair all defects was not endorsed.
[Ref 29: p. 40]
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On the other hand, qualitative judgements by the P & E can never totally he
disregarded. Therefore, an ASPA evaluation which includes both quantitative and
qualitative criteria could provide the CFA with a profile index to rank prospective
candidates for SDLM while retaining the necessary subjective opinion of an
experienced P & E. This author chose to model the P-3 ASPA evaluation in Chapter
V after the experimental A-6 ASPA evaluation in Appendix B.
B. A REVIEW OF ANALYSIS METHODS
Several methods have been devised for quantifying subjective judgements under
conditions of uncertainty. A brief review of their procedures, advantages, and
disadvantages is helpful to justify selecting the most appropriate method.
1. Delphi Technique
The Delphi Technique is a method of statistically refining the opinions of a
group of experts or especially knowledgeable personnel. The advantages of group
judgement in long range planning as well as the disadvantages of "group-think" are
clearly summarized in Stoner's text. Management. [Ref 30: p. 344] The poorly
conceived notion to conduct the Bay of Pigs invasion is considered to be a prime
example of group-think. Group-think, resulting in premature agreements or mediocre
compromises is a major drawback to the group decision process as is the influence of a
dominant individual (one who does the most talking). Another disadvantage to group
decisions is the irrelevant or misinformation that clouds the pertinent material
presented during discussions. A final major drawback to group decision-making is the
group's pressure to compromise.
As a means of lessening the disadvantages of group interaction, the Delphi




• Statistical "group response".
Anonymity counters the effect that a dominant individual has on a group. Anonymity
is preserved by using written questionnaires. Controlled feedback reduces the influence
of misinformation on the group decision. Controlled summaries of questionnaires are
returned to the group members over several iterations for their input. These
summaries are controlled by statistically determining the median responses and the
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range of responses. Successive response summaries require reappraisals of a
respondent's previous conclusions as well as justifications for any marked deviation
from commonly held group conclusions. [Ref. 31: pp. 25-27]
Although systematic processing of expert opinion used in the Delphi
Technique appears to converge on reliable estimates for answers to qualitative
problems, the technique's procedures are often criticized as cumbersome. Researchers
also cannot determine the extent of the influence of factors such as social pressure,
"rethinking" a problem, or idea transfer during feedback. Another disadvantage of the
Delphi Technique is the niisconception that conclusions from this process will be used
in a pre-existing model. Often, a model has never been created for qualitative
problems where the Delphi Technique has been found to be appropriate. [Ref 31: pp.
27-29]
2. Analytical Hierarchy Process
A second method for quantifying the results of qualitative decisions is known
as the AHP (Analytical Hierarchy Process). This process, devised by Thomas L. Saaty,
addresses less of the sociological influences on the decision making process than the
Delphi Technique does. AHP concentrates more on the structure of the decision
making process. AHP identifies decision criteria, measures the interaction between the
criteria, and synthesizes the resulting information to identify priorities. Priorities can
be used to rank alternatives or to plan resource allocations in a non-market
environment such as a XARF.
Basically the AHP is a method of breaking down a complex, unstructured
situation into its component parts; arraneing these parts, or variables, into a
hierarchic order; assigiiine numerical values to subjective judgements on the
relative importance oTeach variable: and svnthesizme the judkements to
determine which variables have the highest priority alid should be acted upon to
influence the outcome of the situation [Ref 32: p. '5].
a. Hierarchy
For example, consider the complex situation which an ASPA inspection
team faces when it attempts to decide whether or not a P-3 requires SDLM. Through
experience with typical or leading indicators of economic or safety related structural
deterioration, a P & E team can draw a hierarchical sketch of their decision process.
The hierarchy can be taken from structurally significant inspection zones Usted on a P
& E's Local Engineering Inspection Sheet. The P & E's logic, intuition, and experience
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Level 1 Focus: P-3 Safety, Economy, and Availability
Level 2 Attributes: Wings Fuselage Empennage Landing Gear
Level 3 Alternatives: ASPA SDLM
Figure 4.1 ASPA Inspection Hierarchy.
allows them to answer the question: How much more does one zone contribute than
another to the overall need for SDLM? The AHP enables a P & E team to eventually
compare all zones to obtain a weighted outcome. This method ensures that zones are
grouped logically and ranked consistently to produce a flexible model of the P & E's
judgement. Figure 4.1 illustrates a simplified hierarchy of the P & E's judgement
process.
b. Matrix
The scale used within each AHP matrix ranges from 1 which denotes equal
importance of the two elements compared, through 9 which represents absolute
importance of one element over another. This Pairwise Comparison Scale, developed
by Saaty and found in Table 1
,
assumes that a scale of nine units "... reflects the
degree to which we can discriminate the intensity of relationships between elements"
[Ref 32: pp. 77-78].
The P & E team needs to establish a priority for the attributes in Level 2.
This is done by pairwise comparisons in a matrix form. The matrix presented in Table
2 provides:
... a framework for testing consistencv, obtaining additional information
through making comparisons, and analvzing the sensitivity of overall priorities to
changes in judg^ement [Ref 32: p. 76].
By judging the element in the left-hand column as it relates to the element
in the top row, the scalar values fill the matrix as seen in Table 2 . If the element in
the left-hand column compares less favorably, then a fraction is noted in the matrix. A
fraction is the reciprocal value of a judgement when the elements' roles are reversed




SAATY'S PAIRWISE COMPARISON SCALE
Intnuuty of
Imnartuncr Dffirttwrt Explanation
1 Equal importance of both
elemenn
Two elements contribute
equally to the property
3 W«ak importance of one
element over another
Experience and judgment
slightlv favor one element
over another
5 Essenfiai or strong impor-
tance of line element over
another
E;iperience and judgment
strongly favor one element
over another
/ Demonvtrated Importance of
one dement over another
An element is strongly-
favored and its dominance is
demonstrated in praaice
9 Absolute importance of one
element over another
The evidence favoring one
element over another is of the
highest possible order of
affirmation




Reaprocais If activity t has one of the
preceding numbers assigned
to it when compared with
activity ;, then i has the
reciprocal value when com-
pared with I
The next step is to develop a quantitative weighting or prionty ranking
scheme. When calculating the pnorities of a matnx objective, Saaty recommends that;
(1) column values be summed and (2) each value be divided by its respective column
total. The resulting values, called eigenvalues, can be used to calculate the hierarchy's




PAIRWISE COMPARISON MATRIX OF P-3 ATTRIBUTES
Attributes: Wings Fuselage L. G.
Winss 1 3 7
Fuselaee .1/3 I 6
Landin'lz Gear 1,7 1/6 1










Consistency Ratio = .067
c. Results
Judgement consistency is measured by means of a Consistency Ratio, this
ratio is the result of comparing the consistency of random judgements on the same
scale and the same size matri.x. Judgements may be considered random if this value
exceeds .10 and should probably be revised.
If the matrix represents consistent judgement, then, as mentioned above,
the eigenvalue may be used to weight the problem's elements or attributes. In the case
of choosing an alternative between ASPA and SDLM, the eigenvalue weights would
prioritize the aircraft's zones in terms of percentages of importance. These zones are
referred to as SDLM drivers. Knowing the "importance percentages" of SDLM drivers
contributing to material condition is an important advantage when estabUshing a
numerical threshold for the ASPA decision.
d. Pros and Cons
There are several other advantages to adopting the AHP which include
[Ref 32: p. 23]:
Unity - AHP's one model is flexible enough to cover a wide range of problems.
Complexity - deductive and systems approaches are integrated to solve complex
problems.
Interdependence - allows for nonlinear logic between problem elements.
Hierarchic structuring - organize complex elements into simpler complementary
levels.
Measurement - new method developed to measure abstract attributes or
alternatives.
Consistency - assures harmony in repetitive judgemental logic.
The primary- disadvantages to the AHP include:
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SIfftplicuy - level analysis may identifv too broad or too narrow a hierarchv to
reflect the decision process.
Iterative - calculating fluctuating eigenvalues on large matrices are time
consuming even witfi computer '"assfstance.
Confidence - confidence interval estimation and hvnothesis testing are not
compatible with AHP's unfamiliar statistical model.
Consensus - potentially difficult to resolve differences of expert opinion.
Commiiment - selling and coordinating the AHP to unwilling participants can
cause questionable, untimely results.
3. Multi-attribute Utility Theory
Multi-attribute utility theory is one of the most popular methods for selecting
a better solution to a problem when inputs are subjective. The developers of this
theor>', Von Xeuman and Morgenstern, postulated that each person has a measurable
preference among choices available in risky situations. They called this preference
"utility" and measured it in units which they termed "utiles". Each person is
hypothesized to maximize their expected utility when making a decision. [Ref 33: p.
89]
In multi-attribute utiUty theory an expected monetary value or opportunity
cost for each of a problem's alternatives is calculated. The results are derived from a
person's preferences for particular outcomes and the probabilities that the problem's
alternatives lead to those outcomes. These probabilities are based on the subjective
predictions of the decision maker. The alternative with the highest monetary' value or
least opportunity cost is picked as the best alternative. [Ref 34: p. 5]
Multi-attribute utility theory has been applied successfully as a decision
making framework for military and industrial problems. [Ref 35] While the theoretical
value of the utiUty concept is useful in many problems, constructing scales of
measurement for subjective data is no simple task. Much of the literature on
subjective scales deals with pairwise comparison data. For instance, a market
researcher may use this method to quantify the relative taste appeal of new food
products.
In the simplest paired comparison experiment, each of several iudees examines a
number of objects two at a time and states which of the two objects is preferred.
No indication of strength of preference is given. Data from these paired
comparisons are then used in a statistical model to estimate a scale or preference
for the objects. [Ref 34: p. 6]
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a. Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantage of multi-attribute utility theon,' is the handling of tradeoffs
in the decision making process. Typically decision makers will choose different
alternatives when diflerent attributes are considered. One alternative is seldom optimal
for all attributes considered, so lower values on some attributes are acceptable as
tradeofls to obtain higher values in other attributes. [Ref. 36: p. 123]
The biggest disadvantage of utility theon.' is the assignment of^ utiles in
place of expected values of objects such as money. For example, participants in the
decision making process may assess the utiUty of money difTerently. Participants may
change their values over time. Worker's values may also change depending on the level
that they work in the organization. [Ref 33: p. 97]
C. POINT SYSTEM
A common variation of utility based decision making is the point system.
Mortgage companies prefer the point system when qualifying customers for loan
eligibility. Universities have also been known to base admission decisions on subjective
aspects converted to some number of points. For example, to qualify for admission,
the admissions ofTice may multiply an applicant's previous grade point average times a
factor such as 100 and add the product to the applicant's entrance exam score such as
the Graduate Management Admissions Test (GMAT) [Ref 33: p. 100]. Needless to
say, the point system simplifies the problem of student admissions and it costs the
university less time and money than did previous more complicated, time intensive
procedures. Cost effective operations is the key to managing any large organization,
whether it is a university or a NARF.
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V. A PROPOSED P-3 QUANTITATIVE APPROACH
A. COST EFFECTIVE DEPOT LEVEL REPAIR STUDIES
In 1972, Lewis Neri and Harold Law developed a quantitative "profile index" to
help them decide which heUcopters should be admitted for rework at the Corpus
Christi Army Depot. Their primary objective was to cut costs due to excessive
inspection man-hours and inefficient aircraft selection for depot rework. Neri and
Law's point system simplified the rehability and maintainabihty goals by inspecting
only critical safety items and "leading indicators".
1. Prioritizing Leading Indicators
Leading indicators, as defined by proposed NALCINST 4730.3A [Ref 37: p.
14], are conditions related to areas, zones, and items that indicate the degradation in
general material condition to such a level that it is obvious that depot level SDLM
tasks would conserve the useful life and economic investment in the aircraft. Army
Depot engineers compiled a list of leading indicators which field inspectors had used to
determine which heUcopters were in need of depot rework. This Hst of leading
indicators which is sometimes referred to as inspection items in this study was then
ranked by depot personnel experienced on the particular airframe:
Initially the entire airframe was considered section by section and specific areas
of deterioration identified. Then the impact of not repairing an area of
deterioration was evaluated. [Ref 1: p. 336]
Assuming that an aircraft is extended in the field without depot level rework.
Army engineers ranked leading indicators based on four criteria:
• Aircraft safety
• Operational availabihty
• Economic effects of accelerated deterioration
• Economic effects of general wear and tear.
A subjective technique called the Emphasis Curve assisted these personnel in ranking a
Ust of helicopter leading indicators through a pair-wise comparison using the four
criteria. Figure 5.1 illustrates the Emphasis Curve technique using P-3 leading
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2. Cockpit







1. Fuel Bay/(:eii score = 3 "18's"
2. Nose Whe ehvell score = 2 "15's"
3. Stub Wing (ext.) score = 1 "20"
4. Cockpit score = "2's"
Figure 5.1 Emphasis Curve: A Ranking Technique.
The procedure for scoring the Emphasis Curve begins by circling the most
critical item in each pairwise comparison block.
Countin2 the number of times an indicator is circled eives its relative importance
- the hisher the score the more critical. . . . Listing in'descending order will sive
the ranR or order of each indicator in relation to tlie other indicators with respect
to the evaluation criteria. [Ref I: p. 337]
If modifications are made to the original list of leading indicators this simple method of
ranking is used to reprioritize the list.
2. Weighting Indicators
Neri and Law devised an ordinal scale for weighting leading indicators under
an assumed curve which they ambiguously refer to as a "Pareto curve". With the
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indicators already ranked, the Army logically assumed that indicator weights occurred
in the same order. The Army also assumed that a small portion of inspection
indicators contributed significantly to the inspection's outcome. This assumption was
based on the "SO-20" rule as well as management intuition.
The '80-20' phenomenon is prevalent in manv situations. For example,
marketing people, frequently find that 20°/o of customers account for SO'^o of total
sales. Universities find that 20% of their courses generate 80°'o of their student
credit hours. [Ref 38: p. 137]
According to Neri and Law, the 80-20 rule or an approximation of it could be
hypothetically expressed as a hyperbolic curve defined by "XY = K"; where "X"
denotes the leading indicators ranked in decreasing significance, "Y" denotes the
arbitrary weight or utility assigned to indicators, and "K" is the constant which
determines the shape of the curve as depicted in Figure 5.2 . They observed that:
Bv proper choice of the constant K, weighting of the indicators can be adjusted
to achieve the balance desired. This choice ofK becomes a management decision
and it is usually related to the desired weight percentage of the firsl designated
number of indicators. [Ref 1: p. 337]
The area under the curve is considered unitv, and each inspection item's
maximum point assignment is numerically proportional to the percentage area of
its slice compared to^unity [Ref 2: p. 5].
In other words, each indicator is given a slice under the hyperbolic curve in the order
of its ranking as a critical leading indicator. Each slices area is used as a measure of
that indicator's importance in relation to the other indicators.
Figure 5.2 shows a "60-40 curve" to describe the weighting relationship
between leading indicators for a P-3. In other words, 40% of the indicators contribute
to 60% of the overall material condition of the aircraft. To distribute this chosen
relationship over all of the leading indicators the value of K was set to 1 10.
For example, the area for the eighth most important leading indicator for a
P-3 is calculated in the following equation:
S^ -^ dx ^ iiJClnf - }vJ) _
+TT7b9 " ^*T^76^ ~ .033
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Figure 5.2 Hyperbolic Curve for XY = 110.
40
in Figure 5.2 .
3. Field Studies
Why did the engineers at the Corpus Christi Army Depot in 1972 and Dale
McPherson at NARF Norfoll^ in 1985 endorse the use of a hyperbolic curve? As one
of the Navy's ASPA champions, Dale McPherson, noted in his Report on the ^'avy
Aircraft Service Period Adjustment Program,
. . . the curve has no particular technical merit except that it allows a minoritv of
important defects to generate a majoritv of points. The relative ranking of defect
tvpes could easilv he linear, step function, or anv other relationship which the
CFA (Cognizant" Field Authoritv) considers appropriate for his aircrait.
[Ref. 29: p. 41]
However, McPherson was intrigued by Neri and Law's evaluation
methodology. It appeared that the Army's quantitative system did correlate
reasonably well with the A-6's present qualitative evaluation system. The Army's
experimental approach boosted McPherson's confidence in the program since it had
been tested in the field. Results from the Army also showed that workload
requirements to implement the program were manageable. [Ref I: p. 341]
As an experiment McPherson utilized this new quantitative comparison
method in parallel with his older qualitative ASPA evaluation. According to recently
published results on 23 aircraft, the quantitative ASPA evaluation provided a rough
index of aircraft material condition [Ref 2: p. 11]. McPherson was able to correlate
the A-6's material condition with the need for SDLM on either side of a "gray zone"
using quantitative indices. (The gray zone is a region of uncertainty where subjective
judgements are necessary).
From a survey on the A-6 aircraft, McPherson was also able to determine a
point threshold of approximately 300 on a scale of 1 to 1000 by using the evaluation
method described in Appendix B, enclosure (1). This threshold was developed over a
period of seven months using a NARF version of the Army's profile index.
McPherson was satisfied with the survey's results after:
. . . a histogram was plotted to see if anv central distributive tendencies exist in
the scores. . . . Although not trulv a 'normal' distribution, the distribution shape
is coherent and shows li range ofscores which presumably represent a range ol
material conditions in the aircraft sample taken. If the score is considered^to be
a condition index for the aircraft evaluated, the 'average' aircraft appears to have
a condition index of 238. For those who might consider the median score to be
representative, the average aircraft mav be considered to have a condition index
of 253. . . . The point spread between lOO'^o (aircraft service period) adjustments
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and no adjustments is 307 minus 253, or 54 points on a lOUO do
54 point gray area' the adjustment rate is 50%. [Ref. 2: pp. 9-1
int scale. In the
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However, McPherson cautions that the present discriminating quality of his numerical
index is not calibrated enough to make the final ASPA determination. Additional data
is necessary to fine-tune the decision threshold and to create an inspection standard.
[Ref. 2: p. 10]
B. PRIORITY FORECASTING AND MANAGEMENT
The Priority Forecasting and Management concept also uses a curve to explain
the percentage of deterioration in relation to the percentage of MSI's (mamtenance
significant items) for mihtan.' weapons systems. MSI's are items which have
significance as determined by a FMEA. AMSI (American Management Systems, Inc.)
called their curve the Planning Forecast Curve. Priority Forecasting and Management
is a method for analyzing a system's Vlaintenance Plans (see Chapter II). When this
method was applied to an FF-1052 class frigate using reliability centered maintenance,
AMSI found conclusive evidence that "... a small percentage of the failure modes
accounted for most of the support consumed by the equipment or system " [Ref 39: p.
2].
PFM (Priority Forecasting and Management) is a process which consists of eight
steps which are diagrammed in Figure 5.3 [Ref 39: p. 19]. In Step 4 the figure shows
that the Planning Forecast Curve is developed. The Planning Forecast Curve is based
on the items's population size and failure rates derived from empirical engineering
research. The research data is used to develop a weighting curve for the purpose of
forecasting the system's logistics demands by MSI. AMSI created a hypothetical
system with ten VISI's in Table 3 [Ref 39: p. 22], to help explain curve generation.
Data in this table was ranked by the products of the MSI's failure rate (failures per five
years) and its population size. From this ranking and associated data, the percentage
of MSI's, and the percentage of cumulative failure rates is used to generate the
system's Planning Forecast Curve. The details of generating these rates are shown in
Table 4 . Note in Table 4 [Ref 39: p. 23], that only 30% of the MSI's account for
70°/o of the cumulative failures.
Figure 5.4 [Ref 39: p. 24] plots the last column of Tables 3 and 4 . The result is
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Figure 5.4 Priority Forecasting Management Steps.
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TABLE 3
FMEA DATA FOR A HYPOTHETICAL SYSTEM
MSI MSI
MSI POPULATION FAILURE RATE PRODUCT RANK
1 1 .36 .36 7
2 5 .50 2.50 3
3 1 .20 .20 9
4 2 2.05 4.10 2
5 1 .10 .10 10
6 12 .20 2.40 4
7 1 .40 .40 6
8 4 1.20 4.30 1
9 2 .16 .32 8
10 12 .10 1.20 5
The Plannins Forecast Curve is an excellent predictor of relative resource
requirements' amon2 a set of maintenance sieniiicant items. With minor
modifications, it can also be used to predict which items will have the greatest
impact on operational availabilitv. The predictive powers make it a vefv' valuable
tool for loeistics planners. [Ref 39: p. oO]
AMSI's method is similar to McPherson's quantitative method. Both methods:
Use of an approximation of the 80-20 rule.
Rank items which are significant to the maintenance of a major weapon system.
Are based in principle on Reliability Centered Maintenance.
Seek efficiency through forecasting.
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• Have been tested with positive preliminary results.
C. P-3 APPLICATION
McPherson's quantitative method was chosen as the model for an improved P-3
ASPA evaluation form for four reasons. The first reason for this author's selection of
McPherson's quantitative method over the others discussed in Chapters IV and V is its
inherent testability or applicability. McPherson's method is highly applicable to Navy
bomber airframes. Many of the "bugs" have been eliminated from the A-6 ASPA
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Figure 5.4 Sample Planning Forecast Curve.
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The second reason was acceptability. When the AMP was proposed as a
plausible model, local NARF logisticians could not be convinced of its merits and
therefore would be less likely to construct a valid decision structure. This structure or
hierarchy is sensitive to the expert's opinion of the research. The iterative nature of
the AHP was also likely to lose critical interest from busy experts halfway through the
structuring process.
The third reason was practicality. While AMSI's empirical method appeals to
this author, neither the database, expertise, nor the funding for contractor assistance
was available.
The final reason was the limited amount of time allocated for thesis research. Of
the previously mentioned methodologies, only McPherson's method was simple enough
for one researcher to complete an inspection form worthy of testing in the time
allowed.
The intention of this author was to soUcit expert opinion at the two primary sites
where P-3 SDLM was performed. From these opinions, a Ust of 48 leading indicators
were compiled primarily from well-known SDLM work areas which are labelled in
Figure 5.5 . Coincidentally, McPherson used the same number of leading indicators for
the A-6. These indicators or inspection tasks were ranked using Xeri and Law's
method for pairwise comparisons. An abbreviated example of this method using
responses from P-3 P & E's is found in Figure 5.1 .
All available P-3 P & E's were asked to compare the 48 leading indicators. Once
the surveyed comparisons were totalled and difTering P & E's responses were agreed
upon, a final ranking of leading indicators was presented to the P & E's. On the basis
of VIcPherson's technique and K = 110, the curve was plotted using the ranking from
the P-3 P & E's comparisons. Plotting the resulting curve helped to explain the
relationship between leading indicators and the overall evaluation score. The P & E's
agreed that the final rankings appeared to be satisfactory'.
As was shown in Figure 5.2
,
a decimal value was calculated for each leading
indicator with the total of the decimals equalling one. To avoid working with fractions
on the final evaluation form, each decimal value was multiplied by 1000, the maximum
score allowed under the arbitrary ASPA standard (OPNAVINST 3110.11 series).
Theoretically, the total of these weights could be any number, as long as it is kept
constant for the area under the curve.
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Figure 5.5 P-3A/B/C Areas Used in New ASPA Evaluation Form.
Next. F & E's were asked to divide each area's maximum score into
distinguishable levels and typical defects. Unfortunately, due to time constraints of the
P Sc E's. this part of the research was not completed. Therefore, as an arbitrary'
estimate, five levels of defect were assumed for each leading indicator. The least
deteriorated level arbitrarily received 20% of the maximum score allocated to each
indicator. The other level's scores increased incrementally by 20%. Therefore, the
worst level of deterioration, level 5, received 100% of the score as seen in Figure 5.6 .
For example, the sixth most important leading indicator for the P-3 was the Starboard
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Ra tik Leading Indicator Area Point Value for
^
Leve 1 of Defect
Low Hieh
1 2 3 4
^
5
1 Overall condition n a 22 43 65 86 108
') Overall corrosion n a 22 43 65 86 108
3 Port wine-aft shear beam 23 20 39 59 78 98
4 Stbd wmg-alt shear beam 24 14 28 43 57 71
5 Port outel- wine (ext)
Stbd outer wine (ext)
25 11 22 33 44 55
6 26 9 18 27 36 45
7 Overall fuel leals n a 8 15 23 30 38
8 Stbd inbrd fuel tank 43 7 13 20 26 33
9 Port inbrd fuel tank 42 6 12 17 23 29
10 Paint condition n/a 5 10 16 21 26
11 Stbd outbrd fuel tank 44 5 10 14 19 24
12 Stbd fwd obsjiead area 4 4 9 13 18 22
13 Port outbrd fuel tank 41 4 8 12 16 20
14 No 2 NAC & MLGwell 28 4 7 11 14 18
15 NO 3 NAC& MLGwell 29 3 7 10 14 17
16 Horvert stabilizer 14 3 6 10 13 16
17 No 1 nacelle/tailpipe 27 3 6 9 12 15
18 Xo 4 nacelle tailpipe 30 3 6 8 11 14
19 Waist cabin( under Hoor) 22 3 5 8 10 13
20 Stub wing Fuel tank 45 3 5 8 10 13
21 APU air cond area 16 2 5 7 10 12
22 NLG well & air cond 15 2 5 7 10 12
23 Fuel bav & bladder cell 18 2 4 7 9 11
24 Cockpit' Area 2 2 4 7 9 11
25 Stub wine(ext) 20 2 4 6 8 10
26 Flieht eneineer area 3 2 4 6 8 10
27 Ratiome X: press bulkhead
No 3 QCU & ace 1 2 4 5 7 928 33 2 4 5 7 9
29 No 2 QCU & ace 32 2 4 5 7 9
30 No 4 QCU & ace 34 2 3 5 7 8
31 No 1 QCU & ace 31 2 3 5 6 8
32 Service bay 19 2 3 5 6 8
33 Hvdraulic service center 21 2 3 5 6 8
34 Port operator sta 8 3 4 6 7
35 Elect load center 9 3 4 6 7
36 Maint records analysis n;a 3 4 6 7
37 Aft waist 12 3 4 6 7
38 Forward waist 11 3 4 6 7
39 Walkwav 10 2 4 5 6
40 Port fwd operator sta
Stbd fwd e ec racks
5 2 4 5 6
41 7 2 4 5 6
42 Port fwd elec racks 6 2 4 5 6
43 Tail cone & stinger 13 2 4 5 6
44 Bomb bay 17 2 4 5 6
45 No 2 prop & spinner 36 2 4 5 6
46
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No 1 prop & spinner









48 No 4 prop & spinner 38 2 3 4 5
Figure 5.6 New P-3 ASPA Evaluation Form.
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Outer Wing (external) with a maximum score of 45. Primar}' defects in this critical
area could be cracks or corrosion. Each of these defects has five distinguishable levels
of deterioration. The more severe level for either defect takes priority. The five levels
of deterioration and their score for this leading indicator are:
1. Minor, repair not required {score of 9).
2. Requires organizational repair (score of 18).
3. Requires routine depot repair (score of 27).
4. Requires engineered depot repair (score of 36).
5. Severe condition, unsalvageable (score of 45).
If, for example, the P & E found level 2 corrosion and level 3 cracks on the Starboard
Outer Wing (exterior), a score of 27 would be assigned to this portion of the ASPA
evaluation form.
While this author arbitrarily assigned all leading indicators five levels of
deterioration, any number and mixture of appropriate levels is feasible. Once the
appropriate number of levels and type of deterioration are assigned to each leading
indicator, the entire evaluation form should be placed in the same order that the P & E
would logically perform the ASPA inspection. A logical order will enhance the
credibility of the new evaluation form in the eyes of the P & E's.
The final quantitative evaluation form should look Uke Figure 5.6 because its
format is very easy to use. The P & E merely circles the most severe defect in each
leading indicator's row which is observed on the P-3 being inspected. Circled values
are sumnied. The total value is returned to the NARF and compared with the total
values reported on other P-3's. After several evaluations, a trend should appear. From
this trend, a numerical criterion should be derivable to help the CFA manager decide
which P-3's to admit to SDLM.
In conclusion, it should be stressed that quantitative analysis is not intended to
furnish a decision, instead it yields information which will facilitate decisions. In the
words of M. J. Cetron, "Data plus analysis yields information. Information plus
judgement yields decisions." [Ref 40: p. 64]
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Every attempt has been made to create a plausible expert model for the ASPA
management decision. By exploring current management science methodologies, a
practical model patterned after quantitative ASPA evaluation methods being tested at
NARF Norfolk and at Army Depot Corpus Christi is proposed. More importantly,
the management at NARF Alameda is afforded the opportunity to rethink a dilTicult
problem which has stymied many Navy logisticians to date.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions are derived:
1. The most important consideration for the manager attempting to refine a
process is to beware of the exceptions to the rule. While the number of leading
indicators listed in Figure 5.6 covers many of the defects visible to the P & E,
additional indicators of imminent deterioration will undoubtedly surface and
should be duly noted on the evaluation sheet. These exceptions may override
the weights appUed to the quantitative model. If so, safety factors usually take
priority over economics and availability decision criterion. The experienced,
intuitive skills and "common sense" of the structural engineer, production
manager, P & E, and when necessary, higher authority, should be reUed on in
these situations.
2. Leading indicators which are economic depot drivers may require only one
inspection which can be performed during the ASPA evaluation. Safety critical
items conventionally require more inspections and should be evaluated at the
organizational level. However, to perform the ASPA inspection correctly,
NARF P & E's should have the expertise required to evaluate economic as well
as safety consequences.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The product of this study. Figure 5.6 , is presented for logistics analysis purposes
only. Without testing this product in the fleet environment, it would be unwise to
endorse this variation over the P-3 LES in current use. Additional analysis is
recommended to:
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1. Assign each leading indicator the appropriate levels and kinds of defects.
2. Determine the ASPA decision criterion on a scale of to 1000.
3. Train P & E's to use the new format in Figure 5.6 with confidence.
4. Corroborate the constant, K. applied to shape the hyperbolic or other suitable
weighting curve.
5. Eliminate insignificant leading indicators and add newer, more significant
indicators.
For further research into the economic aspects of the ASPA problem, it is
recommended that the present Vlaster Data Record (cost database at the NARF) be
applied to the zones identified in the quantitative ASPA evaluation in Figure 5.6 . The
total cost of SDLM (in present value form) could serve nicely as an historical base. If
this base is normally distributed, one can probably verify the weight and sensitivity of
each zone in a multiple regression analysis. For each aircraft use zonal cost data as
independent variables to predict the total cost of SDLM, the dependent variable. The
economic approach to the ASPA problem appears to be the direction that NARF
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TITLE: P-3 Local Engineering Specification
IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION; GEN/AL 12-9-0110
PUBLICATION: None
SUBJECT: P-3 Series Aircraft Service Period Adjustnent (ASPA)
Inspection Requirements
REFERENCES : (a) OPNAVINST 3110.11 series
(b) NAVAIR 01-75PAC-6 P-3 PMIC (Periodic Maintenance Information
Cards)
(c) NA01-75PAA-3-1, P-3 Aircraft Structural Repair Manual
(d) NA01-75PAA-3-2, P-3 Aircraft Structural Repair Manual
(e) NAVAIR 01-75PAC-6-3, P-3 Daily/Special/Preservation
Requirements Cairds
(f) P-3 LPS/AL 02-2-0150, Aircraft Exterior Paint Systems;
evaluation criteria for the stripping of
(g) P-3 LES/AL 18-5-0100, Aileron Lower Inner Skins; standard
repair member for
(h) P-3 LES/AL 18-5-0130, Aileron Intercostals; replacement for
(i) P-3 LES/AL 17-2-0060, Inboard Nacelle Shroud Angle
P/N*s 812789-7 and -8; repair of
(j) P-3 Airframe Bulletin 193, Nose Landing Gear Upper
Drag Strut Inspection and Repair
(k) P-3 LES/AL 23-2-014C, NLG(Nose Landing Gear) Steering
Housing Surface Corrosion; Repair of
P-3 ASPA Aircraft Preparation Requireaents
ASPA Inspection Sunmtary Report Form
ASPA Inspection Results Report Form
To determine current overall material condition of P-3
aircraft. The material condition will determine aircraft suitability for a 12
month service period adjustment within the guidelines of reference (a).
2. CANCELLATION: P-3 LES GEN/AL 12-9-0100 Dated 2 November 1984
3. BACKGROUND: Reference (a) proaul gated operational and rework cycles for the
P-3 aircraft. Operation of an aircraft beyond the specified service period
requires TYCOM review and OPNAV approval. Adjustments to the service period are
contingent upon the material condition of the aircraft. The following
inspections and enclosed report survey document this condition.
4. APPLICATION: All P-3A/B/C and derivative series aircraft.
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6. SPECIAL MATERIALS: None.
7. EFFECTIVE DATE: As soon as possible but not later than 30 Sep 1985.
8. INSTRUCTIONS:
8.0 GENERAL:
8.0.1 Notify NARF Alameda code 322 at least three weeks prior to
performing this inspection. Include BUNO, current Period End Date (PED), number
of previous ASPAs granted this tour and location and date of inspection.
8.0.2 The following instructions are guidelines for the Aircraft Service
Period Adjustment (ASPA) inspection. These instructions represent the minimum
inspection to be performed prior to granting a service period adjustment.
Perform the ASPA inspection at a site designated by the Aircraft Controlling
Custodian. A depot field team composed of an aircraft planner and estimator and
other appropriate personnel as required shall perform this inspection. The
minimum access requirements to accomplish this inspection are included as
enclosure (1). Enclosure (2) is the ASPA Inspection Summary Report Form.
Enclosure (3) is the ASPA Inspection Rusults Form which will be used to determine
the major driving factors which reduce tour length and Service life. Additional
inspections and further disassembly may be accomplished at the discretion of the
Planner and Estimator.
NOTE
Extensive repaint on the exterior is a strong indication
of exterior corrosion problems. If this condition exists,
the planner should interview squadron corrosion control
personnel to ensure that this repaint is in fact an
indication of significant corrosion and not an attempt to
erase "Black Circles" which routinely appear around rivet
heads
.
8.0.3 If the aircraft being inspected shows extensive signs of corrosion
over the entire airframe, this should be considered a strong justification for
recommending against ASPA.
8.0.4 If the aircraft being inspected shows extensive signs of exterior
corrosion or fails the paint tape test, but is recommended for ASPA, a
recommendation for ISR repaint should be included with the ASPA recommendation
report. The recommendation report should note that logistic limitations may
prevent ISR repaint, and that failure to repaint the aircraft could result in an
increase in the operating and rework costs.
8.0.5 The overall material condition of an aircraft reflects a
combination of the quantity and nature of defects found during the ASPA
inspection and the information found during the review of aircraft logbooks and
interviews with squadron maintenance personnel. The recommendation to adjust or
not adjust the PED is based on this overall material condition as follows:
a. A recommendation to adjust the PED is a statement by the ASPA team
that the aircraft may be safely operated for 12 months beyond its current PED
without experiencing disproportionate economic or readiness consequences. This
adjustment recommendation is an evaluation of the overall condition of the
aircraft, and is therefore not contingent upon the correction of any single
defect
.
I). A recommendation not to adjust the PED is a statement that the
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aircraft cannot be operated safely for a full year beyond its current PED without
experiencing disproportionate economic or readiness consequences.
8.1. Aircraft Record analysis:
8.1.1 Review Maintenance Action Forms (OPNAV 4790/41), Naval Aircraft
Flight Records (Yellow Sheets, OPNAV 3760/2), Corrosion Control Records, and the
aircraft log book for identification of chronic problem areas, unusual
conditions, or significant maintenance actions (including structural repairs).
Analyze this historical data for chronic system and component trouble which need
added emphasis during aircraft examination and for significant rise in corrosion
man-hours in the last year. Whenever possible, interview squadron maintenance
personnel familiar with the aircraft. Gain additional information about
potential problem areas to help determine extent of corrective action required
for service period adjustment.
8.1.2 Review the PMIC, reference (b), scheduled removal components for
high time components.
8.1.3 Screen the technical directives section OPNAV 4790/24A or List 2 of
the aircraft log book. Determine incorporation status of technical directives
which would affect aircraft suitability for service period adjustment.
8.1.4 Record the following data in the appropriate box on enclosure (2)
report summary form:
a. Aircraft TMS and bureau number and custodian.
b. Current PED, tour number and number of ASPAs this tour.
c. Total flight hours and flight hours in current tour.
d. Total operational months and total months in current tour.
e. Non-aging time since last SDIM.
f. Last SDLM completion date and last ASPA completion date.
g. Number of lemdings during current tour.
h. Number of overweight and/or hard landings.
i. Most recent phase inspection, date and flight hours at phase.
NOTE
Repair instructions for structural components are found in
references (c) and (d). Where appropriate, additional
references are noted.
8.2 Ensure aircraft has been washed in accordance with reference (e).
Visually inspect the entire paint system for evidence of paint lifting (poor
adhesion), blisters, checked coatings, erosion, and corrosion, especially around
fasteners. Perform wet and dry tape test as outlined in reference (f). Do not
consider cosmetic appearance.
8.3 Check Fuel Tank Integrity:
NOTE
It is the responsibility of the Planner and Estimator to
ensure that the following task is carried out in an
appropriate sequence to provide adequate results. As
such, the fueling/ defueling sequence is at the discretion
of the Planner and Estimator.
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8.3.1 Fill fuel tanks to maxinum capacity. Maintain tanks at capacity
for a mininun of eight hours. Perform a visual insptection of the following areas
for fuel leakage:
NOTE
When fuel leaks are found, classify using criteria of
reference (c) section X. Where possible determine the
source of the leak.
a. Wing planks.
b. Front and rear spars.
c. Fuel tank access panels.
d. Wing tip bulkhead.
e. Fuselage areas adjacent to fuel tanks 5 and 5A.
f. Main landing gear trunions.
g. Wing to fuselage fillets.
8.3.2 Drain all tanks.
8.4 Inspect Wing Structure:
8.4.1 Visually examine the following items for cracks and corrosion:
a. Front rear spars and spar fittings.
b. External stores attachment fastener holes.
c. Flap track attachment fittings and carriages.
d. Wing planks.
8.4.2 Perform general structural, attaching hardware, and control
linkage/cables examination on the following items:
a. Aileron.
NOTE
Reference (g) provides a standard repair member for the
aileron lower inner skins. Reference (h) provides repair





Reference (i) describes the repair part for the nacelle
shroud angle.
e. Nacelle firewall, fireshield and forward tailpipe support
structure.
f. Trailing edge ribs.
NOTE
Reference (c) provides installation data for wing trailing
edge rib repair kits.
g. Leading edges.
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8.4.3 Perform general integrity examination of the following:
a. Nacelle wiring and tubing.
b. Exposed wiring.
8.4.4 Examine areas of previous structural repairs and reinforcements for
cracking, deformation, or evidence of loose and working fasteners.
8.5 Inspect Fuselage and Empennage Structure:
8.5.1 Visually examine the following items for cracks and corrosion:
a. Rear main ring fittings.
b. Forward main ring fittings.
NOTE
Repair of cracked main ring fitting is described in
reference (d).
c. Vertical fin attach fittings.
d. Forward RH jack pad fittings part numbers 917693 & 917694.
8.5.2 Perform general structural, attaching hardware, and control
linkage/cables examination on the following items:





f. Aft fuselage at empennage carrythrough structure (aft of FS 1117).
g. Aft belly compartment and hydraulic service center (aft of wing
center section rear spar beam).
h. Battery support.
i. Bomb Bay.
j. Both sides of aft pressure bulkhead FS 1117 (move flight controls
in order to inspect flight control cables running through bulkhead).
k. Pressure deck above APU compartment for evidence of heat damage.
1. Horizontal stabilizer interior (through access holes).
8.5.3 Perform general integrity examination of all exposed wiring. In
particular, look for heat damage, chafing, abrasions, pinched wire, broken wire
etc.
0.5.4 Examine areas of previous structural repairs and reinforcements for
cracking, deformation, or evidence of loose and working fasteners.
8.6 Inspect Landing Gear.
8.6.1 Perform general structural, attaching hardware, and control
linkage/cables examination on the following items:
a. NLG steering system.
b. Main landing gear.
c. Doors and linkages.
d. Nose landing gear. 57
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NOTE
Incorporate reference (j) if appropriate for the NLG upper
drag strut.
8.6.2 Inspect sealant on NLG steering housing motor nuts. If sealsmt is
not present and intact, flourescent dye penetrant inspect the thread and thread
relief areas of the NLG steering cylinder housing for evidence of cracking.
NOTE
Reference (k) provides repair procedure.
8.6.3 Inspect Main Landing Gear for leaks.
8.6.4 Inspect all landing gear pistons for damaged chrome.
8.6.5 Perform general integrity examination of all exposed wiring.
8.6.6 Examine areas of previous structural repairs and reinforcements for
cracking, deformation, or evidence of loose and working fasteners.
8.6.7 Record overhaul due dates and serial numbers of all landing gear.
Advise custodian and functional wing maintenance officers if overhaul due date(s)
(132 months) will expire prior to revised PED.
8.7 Contact the P-3 Aircraft Systems Engineering Division if any unusual
damage not associated with aircraft age or service history (eg. Indication of
primary structure over-stress) is found. Engineering will provide subsequent
inspections and repairs.
8.8 List all defects on standard E & E Aircraft Discrepancy Record. Include
task number or special task which revealed defect. Identify all defects
requiring depot resources to repair. Report must be signed by depot Planner and
Estimator and by an authorized representative of the controlling custodian.
Submit completed form to the controlling custodian and to the P-3 Weapon System
Engineering Division (Code 320).
NOTE
Classification of defects are as follows:
DEFECT: Any deviation of a unit or part from specified
requirements.
DEFECT. CRITICAL: A defect that constitutes a hazardous
or unsafe condition, or as determined by experience and
judgment could conceivably become so, relative to its
deleterious effect on the prime intended function, safety
of flight or mission capability of the aircraft or its
operating personnel.
DEFECT. MAJOR: A defect, other than critical, that could
result in failure or materially reduce the useability of
the unit or part for its intended purpose.
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DEFECT. MINOR: A defect that does not materially reduce
the useability of the unit or part for its intended
purpose, or is a departure from standards which has no
significant bearing on the effective use or operation of
the unit part.
8.9 The Planner-Estimator on the depot team will prepare a Naval message or
Speedletter as appropriate at the inspection site. Transmit the message to the
TYCOM/aircraft custodian, NALC-220, and NAVAIREWORKFAC Alameda. Include the
following information in the message text:
a. TMS and BUNO
b. Current PED
c. Tour number
d. Total operating service months/ operating months this tour
e. Total operating hours/ operating hours this tour
f. Total landings this tour/ hard or overweight landings this tour
g. ASPA inspection start date/ completion date
h. Number of ASPA inspections this tour
i. Number of man-hours spent on inspection - org / int / depot
j. Quantity of defects discovered listed by category, i.e., critical,
major, minor, and description of all critical or major defects requiring depot
resources to repair. Identify critical defects with "CR" tmd major defects with
"MA". Provide manhour and material estimates for depot defect correction.
k. Recommendation regarding suitability of the aircraft for a 12 month




If a speedletter is used to transmit the results of the
inspection, the appropriate TYCOM shall be notified of
these results by phone within 5 working days of
completion. Points of contact are:
P-3 ASPA AIRCRAFT PREPARATION REQUIREMENTS dated 18 Sept 85
To prepare the aircraft for ASPA inspection, wash the aircraft in accordance
with NAVAIR 01-75PAA-6-3 wash requirements and then open the following panels
and doors (Refer to NA01-75PAA-2-1)
:
NOTE
At the option of the planner and estimator on the depot
inspection team, additional areas may require examination
to determine extent of defect (s). Accordingly, additional
panels and access doors may be identified for removal or
opening.
a. Nose radome.
b. Battery down/ APU door open.
c. Bomb bay doors.
d. Oil cooler doors.
e. Fuselage access panels (Fll; F23; F108; Fill; F1271; F128R).
f. Nacelle access panels (N107 L&R; N132 L&R; and N133 L&R)
.
g. Hinged leading edges (W24 lAR; W25 L&R).
h. Leading edge access panels. (W27 L&R; W28 L&R; W30 L&R; W32 L&R; W34
L&R; W35 L&R)
i. Flap well access doors. (W6 L&R; W7 L&R; W8 L&R; W9 L&R; WIO L&R; Wll
L&R; W12 L&R)
j. Aileron well access doors. (W14 L&R; W15 L&R; W16 L&R; W17 L&R; W18
L&R)
k. Aileron access door. (W13 L&R)
1. QECK access doors (PI & P2) and access panels (N117 L&R; N118 L&R;
N141 L&R; N142 L&R).
m. Tailpipe turtlebacks. (N151 L&R; N152 L&R; N153 L&R; N154 L&R; N155
L&R)
n. Remove wing tips.
o. Remove wing stores pylons and wing stores fittings plugs.
p. Hydraulic center access hatch. (F21)
q. Vertical stabilizer side doors. (E8; E9; ElO)
r. Horizontal stabilizer access panels. (E116 L&R; E6 L&R; E117 L&R; E4
L&R; E120 L&R; E122 L&R; E124 L&R; E126 L&R; E128 L&R; E130 L&R; E132 L&R)
s. Lower empennage access door. (El)
t. Extend aft radome (stinger).
u. Propeller afterbody top halves.
v. Lower firewall panels.
w. Engine pie pans (4 per engine).
X. Lower inboard and outboard fire shield panels (2) (Nacelles 1 & 4).
HRD access panels and upper and lower fire shield panels (4) (Nacelles 2 & 3).
y. LH lower wing to fuselage fillet FS 553-571 (P/N 900545-3, 900545-
21.926323-3 or 926323-103). RH lower wing to fuselage fillet FS 533-571 (P/N
939484-105, 939484-107 or 937859-103).
z. Two center floorboards adjacent to aft pressure bulkhead,
aa. Floor boards over APU exhaust.
bb. Floor boards over RH forward Jack/mooring fitting.
Ensure that all access panels, doors and other items removed or opened in











NUMBER OF PREVIOUS ASPA3 THIS TOUR:
PERIOD END DATE:
FLIGHT HOURS THIS TOUR:
TOTAL OPERATING MONTHS: OPERATING MONTHS THIS TOUR:
NON-AGING TIME SINCE LAST SDLM (OR SINCE NEW IF NO PREVIOUS SDLM):_
DATE OF LAST SDLM:
OVERWEIGHT:NUMBER OF LANDINGS THIS TOUR:,
NUMBER OF O/I DEFECTS:















ASPA INSPECTION SUNWARY REPORT FORM
BUNO: DATE OF INSPECTION:
EXTERIOR PAINT
DRY TAPE TEST: PASSED FAILED
WET TAPE TEST: PASSED FAILED
OVERALL CONDITION: EXCELLENT GOOD FAIR POOR
APPARENT PERCENTAGE OF ORIGINAL PAINT REMAINING INTACT:
CO^WENTS
:
LAST OVERHAUL DATE AND S/N FOR LANDING GEAR: NOSE GEAR:
LEFT MLG: RIGHT MLG:
NUMBER OF DEFECTS REQUIRING INTEWIEDIATE LEVEL REPAIR:
DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRS REQUIRED:
ESTIMATED MAN-HOURS FOR DEPOT DEFECT CORRECTION:
START DATE: ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:
TAT: DAYS
I RECO^WEND THIS AIRCRAFT FOR A 12 MONTH SERVICE PERIOD ADJUSTMENT.
I DO NOT RECOM^ND THIS AIRCRAFT FOR A 12 MONTH SERVICE PERIOD ADJUSTMENT.







ASPA INSPECTION RESULTS REPORT FORM
AIRCRAFT TMS:
INSTRUCTIONS
BUNO: DATE OF INSPECTION:
Inspect the aircraft in accordance with the ASPA LES. Provide the requested
infonnation in the space provided. Where a ranking is requested, is the best
overall condition and 9 is the worst overall condition. In the "RANK" column,
provide the relative ranking importance for each item in terms of that items
negative impact on the overall condition of the aircraft. For the "RANK" column,
use a "0" for no impact, and a "9" for the most severe impact. These data sheets
will be used to help evaluate the effectiveness of the ASPA program as it applies
to the P-3 model aircraft.
RANK PARAGRAPH DESCRIPTION RATING OR DATA
8.1 FLIGHT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS ACFT
8.1 FLIGHT HOURS LAST 12 MOS. ACFT
8.1 CORR CTRL HOURS LAST 90 DAYS ACFT
8.1 CORR CTRL HOURS LAST 12 MOS. ACFT
8.1 FUEL LEAK HOURS LAST 90 DAYS ACFT
8.1 FUEL LEAK HOURS LAST 12 MOS. ACFT
8.2 FUSELAGE PAINT CONDITION
8.2 WING PAINT CONDITION
8.2 SOLAR CAP PAINT CONDITION
8.2 WHEEL/ FLAP WELL PAINT CONDITION
8.2 EMPENNAGE PAINT CONDITION
8.2 OVERALL PAINT CONDITION
8.2 PERCENT PAINT TOUCH-UP
8.3.1a FUEL LEAKS TANK #1 TOP PLANK 1-2
8.3.1a FUEL LEAKS TANK #1 LOW PLANK 1-2
8.3.1b FUEL LEAKS TANK #1 FOR SPAR 1-2
8.3.1b FUEL LEAKS TANK #1 AFT SPAR 1-2
8.3.1c FUEL LEAKS TANK #1 ACCESS 1-2













10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
3-5 5-8 8-10 11 OR MORE
3-5 5-8 8-10 11 on MORE
3-5 5-8 8-10 11 OR MORE
3-5 5-8 8-10 11 OR MORE
3-5 5-8 8-10 11 OR MORE
3-5 5-8 8-10 11 OR MORE
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Enclosure C3)
ASPA INSPECTION RESULTS REPORT FORM
AIRCRAFT TMS: BUNG: DATE OF INSPECTION:
RANK PARAGRAPH DESCRIPTION RATING OR DATA
OVERALL CONDITION BOMB BAY 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION FWD FS-1117 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION AFT FS-1117 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION APU PRES DECK 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION LH HORIZ STAB 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION RH HORIZ STAB 0123456789
CONDITION OF FUSELAG EXPOSD WIRE 0123456789
CONDITION OF FUSELAG PREV REPAIR 0123456789
CONDITION OF NLG STEERING SYSTEM 0123456789
CONDITION OFLHMLG 0123456789
CONDITION OF LH MLG 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
CONDITION OF LH MLG DOORS/ LINKS 0123456789
CONDITION OF RH MLG DOORS/ LINKS 0123456789
CONDITION OF NLG DOORS & LINKS 0123456789
CONDITION OF NLG 0123456789
NLG STEERING HOUSING SEALNT OK THRDS OK TRHDS CRKD
SEVERITY OF LH MLG LEAKS NONE 123456789
SEVERITY OF RH MLG LEAKS NONE 123456789
CONDITION OF LH MLG EXPOSD CHROM 0123456789
CONDITION OF RH MLG EXPOSD CHROM 123456789
CONDITION OF NLG EXTX)SD CHROME 0123456789
CONDITION OF LH MLG EXPOSD WIRE 0123456789
CONDITION OF RH MLG EXPOSD WIRE 0123456789
CONDITION OF NLG EXPOSED WIRE 0123456789
OVERALL SUITABILITY OF AIRCRAFT 0123456789




























ASPA INSPECTION RESULTS REPORT FORM
AIRCRAFT IMS: BUNO: DATE OF INSPECTION:
RANK PARAGRAPH DESCRIPTION RATING OR DATA
FUEL LEAKS TANK #5 AFT SPAR 1-2 3-5 5-8 8-10 11 OR MORE
FUEL LEAKS TANK #5 ACCESS 1-2 3-5 5-8 8-10 11 OR MORE
FUEL LEAKS TANK #5 BL-65 1-2 3-5 5-8 8-10 11 OR MORE
FUEL LEAKS TANK #5 FILLETS 1-2 3-5 5-8 8-10 11 OR MORE
CONDITION OF LH WING AFT SPAR 0123456789
CONDITION OF LH WING STORES FTG 0123456789
CONDITION OF LH WING FLAP TRACK 0123456789
CONDITION OF LH WING PLANKS 0123456789
CONDITION OF RH WING AFT SPAR 01234 5 6789
CONDITION OF RH WING STORES FTG0123456789
CONDITION OF RH WING FLAP TRACK 0123456789
CONDITION OF RH WING PLANKS 0123456789
CONDITION OF LH AILERON 0123456789
CONDITION OF LH AILERON TABS 0123456789
CONDITION OF LH WING FLAP 0123456789
CONDITION OF #1 TAILPIPE SHROUD 0123456789
CONDITION OF #2 TAILPIPE SHROUD 0123456789
CONDITION OF #1 NACELLE 0123456789
CONDITION OF #2 NACELLE 0123456789
CONDITION OF LH TRAILNG EDGE RIB 0123456789
CONDITION OF LH LEADING EDGE 0123456789
CONDITION OF RH AILERON 0123456789
CONDITION OF RH AILERON TABS 0123456789
CONDITION OF RH WING FLAP 0123456789
CONDITION OF #3 TAILPIPE SHROUD 0123456789































ASPA INSPECTION RESULTS REPORT FORM
AIRCRAFT IMS: BUNO: DATE OF INSPECTION:
RANK PARAGRAPH DESCRIPTION RATING OR DATA
CONDITION OF *3 NACELLE 0123456789
CONDITION OF #4 NACELLE 0123456789
CONDITION OF RH TRAILNG EDGE RIB 123456789
CONDITION OF RH LEADING EDGE 0123456789
CONDITION OF #1 NAC WIRE/TUBING 0123456789
CONDITION OF *2 NAC WIRE/TUBING 0123456789
CONDITION OF LH WING EXPOSD WIRE 0123456789
CONDITION OF #3 NAC WIRE/TUBING 0123456789
CONDITION OF #4 NAC WIRE/TUBING 0123456789
CONDITION OF RH WING EXPOSD WIRE 0123456789
CONDITION OF LH WING PREV REPAIR 0123456789
CONDITION OF RH WING PREV REPAIR 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION OF AFT RING FT 123456789
OVERALL CONDITION OF FOR RING FTOl 23456789
CONDITION OF VERT FIN ATTCH FTG 0123456789
CONDITION OF FOR RH JACK/MOR FTGO 123456789
OVERALL CONDITION DOORS/ LINKAGS 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION LH ELEVATOR 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION RH ELEVATOR 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION LH ELVATOR TAB 123456789
OVERALL CONDITION RH ELVATOR TAB 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION RUDDER 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION RUDDER TAB 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION CARRYTHROUGH 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION BELLY CMPRT 0123456789



































ASPA INSPECTION RESULTS REPORT FOFM
AIRCRAFT TMS: BUNO: DATE OF INSPECTION:
RANK PARAGRAPH DESCRIPTION RATING OR DATA
OVERALL CONDITION BOMB BAY 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION FWD FS-I117 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION AFT FS-1117 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION APU PRES DECK 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION LH HORIZ STAB 0123456789
OVERALL CONDITION RH HORIZ STAB 0123456789
CONDITION OF FUSELAG EXPOSD WIRE 0123456789
CONDITION OF FUSELAG PREV REPAIR 0123456789
CONDITION OF NLG STEERING SYSTEM 0123456789
CONDITION OFLHMLG 0123456789
CONDITION OF LH MLG 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
CONDITION OF LH MLG DOORS/ LINKS 0123456789
CONDITION OF RH MLG DOORS/ LINKS 0123456789
CONDITION OF NLG DOORS & LINKS 0123456789
CONDITION OF NLG 0123456789
NLG STEERING HOUSING SEALNT OK THRDS OK TRHDS CRKB
SEVERITY OF LH MLG LEAKS NONE 123456789
SEVERITY OF RH MLG LEAKS NONE 123456789
CONDITION OF LH MLG EXPOSD CHROM 0123456789
CONDITION OF RH MLG EXPOSD CHROM 0123456789
CONDITION OF NLG EXTOSD CHROME 0123456789
CONDITION OF LH MLG EXPOSD WIRE 0123456789
CONDITION OF RH MLG EXPOSD WIRE 0123456789

























8 .9 OVERALL SUITABILITY OF AIRCRAFT 0123456789





A-6 LOCAL ENGINEERING SPECIFICATION
J:/ NAVAL AIR REWORK FACILITY
3^ NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511
Code NARF-322/DLM
Date: SO APR 1985
TITLE: A-6 Local Engineering Specification
IDET^IFICATION/CLASSIFICATION: A-6 Rework/NO (01) 7183 Rev D
SUBJ: A-6E, KA-6D, and EA-6A Aircraft Service Period Adjustment (ASPA);
inspection requirements for
REF: (a) NAVAIREWORKFAC Norfolk LES A-6 Rework/NO (01) 7183 Rev C
(b) NAVAVNLOGCEN INST. M730.XX (DRAFT ASPA INSTRUCTION)
(c) NA 01-85ADF-4-1
(d) NA 01-85ADA-i|-l
ENCL: (1) ASPA Evaluation Sheet
(2) ASPA Score Sheet
(3) Adjustment Criteria
(4) Zonal inspection guidelines
1. PURPOSE: To provide A-6E, KA-6D and EA-6A aircraft evaluation
procedures which allow a depot field team to assess aircraft material
condition and suitability for one 12 month increase to the original
operating service period end date (PED).
2. CANCELLATION: Reference (a) is cancelled and superseded.
3. BACKGROUND: This directive has been prepared to provide a quantitative
method for evaluating aircraft condition in accordance with the guidance of
reference (b). The evaluation results in a numerical condition index which
is indicative of the aircraft's overall material conditiOTi and which can be
used to compare its condition with other aircraft of the same T/M/S. The
P&E's evaluation of the individual discrepancies and the condition index is
used to identify aircraft which can be prudently op>erated for another year
without causing significant degradation in their maintainability, safety,
or salvageability.
k. INSPECTION TEAM: The ASPA inspection team will be responsible for
accomplishing the inspection requironents, reporting the results and
providing repair cost estimates, and reconmending aircraft suitability for
12 month PED increase. The ASPA inspection team will consist of a P & E,
assisted by E & E personnel as required.
5. APPLICATION: This directive applies to all A-6E, KA-6D, and EA-6A
aircraft requiring the first evaluation for an increase to their current
PED. The inspection specified in this directive shall be acccnplished by a
depot ASPA evaluation team as directed by the NAVAVNLOGCEN. The ASPA
evaluation is required during the six (6) month period prior to the PED of
the affected aircraft, and is normally requested by the controlling
custodian.
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The examination outlined in this directive is intended to be
perfonned at the aircraft reporting custodian's operating site.
The disassembly and reassenbly required for the evaluation is
intended for acconplishment by the reporting custodian.
The preparation directions in paragraphs 8.1 through
8.2.11 are also contained in the organizational level MRC
decks
.
8.1 Wash aircraft and make safe for maintenance.
8.2 Prepare aircraft as follows prior to inspection:
8.2.1 Open nose radome (access number 15^).
8.2.2 Remove canopy.
8.2.3 * Spread wings.
8.2.4 »Fully extend flaps and slats.
8.2.5 Open wingtip speedbrakes.
8.2.6 Open forward engine bay doors, access number 26 and 107 (32 and 101
on EA-6A).
8.2.7 Lower extensible equipment platfonn, access panel number 204 (216 on
EA-6A.
8.2.8 Remove B/N-EWO ejection seat and cockpit right hand console panels
illustrated in reference (c) Figure 1-107, itans 29 and 31 for A-6E BUNO
158041 and sub; and reference (d), Figure l-6l, items 8 and 12 for all
other A-6E, KA-6D, and EA-6A aircraft. Ronove cockpit center console
panels illustrated in reference (c). Figure 1-106, items 135 and 141 for A-
6E BUNO 158041 and sub; and reference (d), Figure 1-60, items 15 and 16D
for all other A-6E, KA-6D and EA-6A aircraft.
8.2.9 Remove forward, mid, and aft fuselage fuel cell covers, access panel
numbers 115, 116, and 117, respectively (111, 131, and 115 on EA-6A).
8.2.10 Open forward equipment bay doors (EA-6A only).
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8.2.11 Open following access panels:
Panel No. Description
A-6E/KA-6D EA-6A
L/H forward shoulder panel
L/H aft shoulder panel
Cooling turbine








R/H aft shoulder panel




Ram air turbine conpartment
Slat drive gearbox access
•At start of inspection, flaps and slats will be extended and wings will
be spread. External electrical and hydraulic power source is required
during inspection to retract flaps, slats, speedbrakes, and to fold wings.
8.3 Utilize the ASPA Evaluation Sheet (enclosure 1.) to record the
conditions found at each specified location on the aircraft. For each item
circle the code which corresponds to the most serious defect observed,




















LES A-6 Rework/NO (01) 7183 Rev D
inspecting the aircraft, note any critical or major defects not addressed
by the evaluation sheet. Record such itars on the second page of the
evaluation sheet. Enclosure (M) may be used as a guide for detecting
miscellaneous discrepancies.
8.3.1 MAINTENANCE RECORD REVIEW: ITEM 1.
Review individual maintenance records with custodian assistance for
indications of excessive corrosion control expenditures, wiring problems
beyond squadron troubleshooting capability, and chronic fuel leaks. Note
evidence of repeated gripes on landing gear, flight controls, environmental
control system, or aircraft electrical power supply systems. Review
logbook miscellaneous/history section (OPNAV '4790/25A) for unusual events
such as exposure to salt water, fire extinguishing agents or other
corrosive media.
8.3.2 FORWARD FUSELAGE : ITEMS 2., 3-. 4., 5-, and 6.
a. ITEM 2. Evaluate the nose radane for erosion (wear), delamination,
corrosion of metal structure, dents, and misalignment.
b. ITEM 3. Examine intake duct leading edge for deterioration or
badly worn (eroded) surface.
c. ITEM 4. Examine intake duct splitter boards for evidence of
delamination or internal corrosion.
d. ITEM 5. Examine internal surfaces of intake duct for cracking,
failed internal structure (oil canning) or loose fasteners.
e. ITEM 6. Examine left and right boarding ladder latch mechanisms,
including locking bushings, for evidence of wear, loose fasteners,
misalignment or buckled structure.
8.3.3 COCKPIT: ITEMS ?., 8., 9., 10., and 11.
a. ITEM 7. Examine canopy glass for visibility obstructions, optical
distortion, scratches, and crazing.
b. ITEI^ 8. Examine windshields for obstructions to visibility
(de laminations, chips, cracks) , optical distortion, or scratches.
c. ITEM 9. Examine cockpit sloping bulkhead for evidence for
structural corrosion.
d. ITEM 10. Examine windshield frame for evidence of external or
internal corrosion.
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e. ITEM 11. Examine cockpit deck under open consoles and B/N seat for
corrosion.
a.S.i^ UPPER FUSELAGE: ITEMS 12., 13., 14., 15., 16., and 17.
a. ITEM 12. Examine inboard wing walkway assemblies, top and bottom for
evidence of de lamination and previous repairs.
b. ITEM 13. Examine AC/X relay box installation for corroded
structure, corroded connectors, or deteriorated wire insulation.
c. ITEM 14. Examine upper portions of F.S. 227.25 bulkhead for
cracking.
d. ITEM 15. Examine upper fuselage longerons for corrosion,
particularly around nutplates.
e. ITEM 16. Examine fuselage tank top panels for cracking or
corrosion.
d. ITEM 17. Examine battery compartment for corrosion.
8.3.5 ENGINE AREA AND WHEELWELLS: ITEMS 18., 19., 20., 21., and 22.
a. ITEM 18. Examine lower areas of F.S. 227.25 (forward main
wheelwells) for cracking of lugs.
NOTE:
Aircraft found to have cracks or previous repairs at the F.S. 227.25
bulkhead will be allowed only one twelve month adjustment, assuming
the overall aircraft condition is otherwise suitable for adjustment.
b. ITEMS 19. and 20. Examine visible portions of left and
right hand keel areas for cracking, dents, and previous repairs.
c. ITEM 21. Examine forward and aft engine bay doors for loose (worn)
hinges or latch mechanisms, buckled structure, misalignment, dents, and
deteriorated seals.
d. ITEM 22. Examine forward and aft landing gear doors for loose
(worn) bearings or linkages, buckled structure, misalignment, dents, and
deteriorated seals.
8.3.6 LEFT & RIGHT WING PANELS: ITEMS 23.. 24. and 34.. 25- and 35.. 26..
27., 28. and 29., 30. and 36., 31. and 37., 32., and 33.
a. ITEM 23. Examine the lower skin in the vicinity of W.S. 65
(fishmouth area) for evidence of corrosion attack. Keep in mind that any
visible clues of corrosion here are usually indicative of a severe attack.
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b. ITEMS 2k. and 3^. Examine lower wing skin of inner and outer wing
panels in the vicinity of the wingfold actuator attachment fitting for any
evidence of corrosion as evidenced by peeling, cracking, bubbled, or loose
paint. Corrosion in this area usually originates around the heads of the
large steel structural fasteners. IXie to sealant and paint system, even
minor clues here are usually indicative of a severe corrosive attack.
c. ITEMS 25. and 35. With slats extended, examine leading edge slat
grooves and guides for any evidence of cracking or corrosion.
d. ITEM 26. Examine pylon wiring and connectors for deterioration.
e. ITEM 27. Examine fuel quantity feedthroughs in wing beams for any
evidence of corrosion attack (visible in wheelwell).
f. ITEMS 28. and 29. To the extent possible, examine the left and
right hand leading edge "bumps" (ALQ-126 antenna enclosures) for evidence
of corrosion.
g. ITEMS 30. and 36., 31. and 37. Examine the inner and outer wing panel
flap ribs for cracking and wear of the tracks and bearing surfaces. With
the flaps extended, examine the trailing edges of the inner and outer wing
panels for corrosion.
h. ITEM 32. Retract the flaps and slats and fold the aircraft
wings. Examine the wingfold area for any evidence of deteriorated wiring
or connectors. Such deterioration may include chafing, cracking of
insulation, corrosion, bad connector potting, fluid damage, evidence of
overheating, damaged splices, or damaged connectors.
i. ITEM 33. Examine the wingfold shear fittings between the hinge and
lock fittings for corrosion. Also check wingskin around the edge of the
lock fittings for corrosion. Again, any visible clues are usually
synptomatic of severe corrosion attack.
8.3.7 AFT FUSELAGE AND TAIL: ITEMS 38., 39., 40. AND Ml., 42., 43., 44.,
45., AND 46.
a. ITEM 38. Examine left and right fixed tailpipe fairing
installations for general deterioration, buckling, loose (failed)
structure, cracks, or loose fasteners.
b. ITEM 39. Evaluate extensible equipment platform for loose (worn)
hinges and alignment bushings, buckling, misalignment, dents, and
deteriorated seals.
c. ITEMS 40. and 41. Examine lower portions of F.S. 451.5 bulkhead for
cracking, particularly in the area of hook lift cylinder attachment. Also
examine rivet rows in upper flange areas for cracking.
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d. ITEM M2. Examine tailhook trough area for structural cracking,
paying particular heed to "softness" which is indicative of failure in
supporting structure.
e. ITEM 43. Examine horizontal stabilizer installation for evidence of
excess mechanical play, cracking, failed internal structure, loose
fasteners, or temporary repairs.
f. ITEM 44. Examine stabilizer wipe area for corrosion and cracking.
g. ITEM 45. Evaluate rudder hinges for excess wear (play).
h. ITEM 46. Examine vertical fin base for evidence of corrosion
related delamination and previous repairs.
8.3.8 PAINT CONDITION: ITEM 47.
a. The exterior pa:int system (in conj\inction with sealants) performs
the function of protecting surfaces from the corrosive effects of the
atmosphere. On all except the KA-6D aircraft, the paint also camouflages
the form of the aircraft in flight.
b. Examine the exterior of the aircraft for paint condition using the
fol lowing guidelines:
DESCRIPTION QUALITATIVE CONDITION
Paint coverage complete. Few cracks EXCELLENT
on surface or rivet heads.
Sane cracking on rivet heads, but most rivet GOCD
heads covered. Very little peeling or evidence
of large touched up areas.
Many rivet heads partially bare. Some evidence FAIR
of peeling, checking, or minor corrosion. Some
large areas touched up or oversprayed.
Paint oxidized with whitish cast. Numerous areas POOR
showing corrosion or major touch-up/overspray.
More than I/3 of surface has defects such as checking,
bare spots, or peeling.
74
LES A-6 Rework/NO (01) 7183 Rev D
8.3.9 OVERALL CONDITION: ITEM 48.
Ihis item should be marked after all the other items on the sheet have
been evaluated. The evaluation includes this requirement in order to
furnish an overall judgment of the condition of the aircraft which
may not be addressed sufficiently by the specific indicators.
8.4 Evaluation Conclusions:
8.4.1 Provide a copy of all pages of the completed Evaluation Sheet (not
the score sheet) to the reporting custodian.
8.4.2 The circled defects corresponding to each specific inspection must
be transferred from the evaluation sheet to the score sheet. To do this
for each item, mark the same column on the score sheet that is marked on
the Evaluation Sheet. For example, for item 23 (LOWER SKIN-W.S. 65), if
column 5 (Code F3) is circled on the Evaluation Sheet, then circle the
number in column 5 on the score sheet. Notice that "Z" codes on the
evaluation sheet do not need to be transferred since they indicate that no
defect was observed. When all of the evaluation Items on the score sheet
have been marked or determined to have no defect, write the circled numbers
in the "Score" column and add up the point score for the aircraft.
8.4.3 The ASPA inspection will uncover defects which can be used as an
indication of the aircraft's overall material condition. If the aircraft's
indicated condition is such that an additional year of service beyond the
present PED would not be expected to cause a disproportionate inpact in
safety, maintainability, or cost of rework, then the ASPA evaluator shall
recommend a service period adjustment. If, however, the aircraft's
indicated condition is such that safety of flight might be compromised,
structural failure is likely, portions of aircraft structure might become
economically unsal vageable, or inordinate amounts of squadron maintenance
man-hours might be needed during an additional year of service, then a
service period adjustment recommendation is not warranted. Refer to
enclosure (3) for additional criteria relating to service period
adjustment
.
8.4.4 Since the evaluation relies heavily on leading indicators for an
assessment of the overall aircraft condition, the ASPA evaluation cannot be
expected to produce a list of discrepancies, which if corrected, will
permit a recommendation for service period adjustment to be made. The
indicators are used to point to a high probability of hidden defects in the
aircraft, therefore, if the indicators are repaired, any hidden defects
still remain.
8.4.5 Discovery of major or critical defects requiring depot level repair,
which are not leading indicators of other defects, will not affect the
recommendation for service period adjustment provided in-service repair is
feasible. In such cases, information concerning the defect(s) will be
provided on the ASPA evaluation message. It should be noted that critical
75
LES A-6 Rework/NO (01) 7183 Rev D
defects, by definition, affect flight safety and must be resolved before
the aircraft is even placed back in a flight status.
NOTE
Adjustment recommendations should not be contingent on
organizational level correction of defects. A copy of the
evaluator's list of defects noted during the insi:>ection
will be provided to the custodian for information purposes.
9. REPORTING:
a. The ASPA inspection team will forward a copy of the Evaluation
sheet (all pages) to NAVAIREWORKFAC Norfolk (ODde NESO-32230). A copy of
the evaluation sheet (not the score sheet) shall also be provided to the
aircraft custodian.
b. The Facility conducting the inspection shall notify the applicable
controlling custodian point of contact of the evaluation results by
telephone within 5 working days. Points of contact are:
CCMNAVAIRLANT (Code 525) Autovon 564-2470
COMNAVAIRPAC (Code 721) Autovon 951-5761
COMNAVAIRESFOR New Orleans (Code 5720) Autovon 363-1220
c. The Facility conducting the inspection shall, within 10 working
days, send the below listed information by means consistent with NAVOPS
049/85:
(If a message is not used, quote: "This is in lieu of a Naval message




(4) Total operating service months
(5) Total operating hours/this period.
(6) ASPA inspection date.
(7) ASPA inspection number (1st ASPA, 2nd ASPA, etc.)
(8) Number of manhours expended in the ASPA evaluaticn
(Organizational /Depot
)
(9) List of critical or major Depot level defects found.
76
LES A-6 Rework/NO (01) 7183 Rev D
(10) Identification of those critical or major defects which
require depot resources, i.e., depot skills, equipment or
facilities.
(11) Repair man-hour and turnaround time estimates for defects
requiring depot level correction.
(12) Reconmendation: A brief narrative as to the suitability of
the aircraft for a 12 month adjustment to the present PED.




(a) Type Commander or Aircraft controlling custodian
(b) NALC-520
Info:
(a) Cognizant Field Activity
(b) Reporting Custodian
(c) Functional Wing
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SER. MDWTHS: TOT. FLT HRS THIS PERIOD:
NO. INDICATOR
LEVEL OF DEFECT
COL: 1 2~T~1 5 6 7
1. MAINTENANCE RECORD REVIEW
2. NOSE RADOME P
3. INTAKE DUCT FIBERGLAS
k. SPLITTER BOARDS
5. INTAKE DUCT
6. BOARDING LADDER LATCHES
7. CANOPY GLASS
8. WINDSHIELDS
9. COCKPIT SLOPING BLKHD
10. WINDSHIELD FRAME
11. COCKPIT DECK
12. WING WALKWAYS El
13. AC/DC RELAY BOX
Ik. BULKHEAD 227.25 (UPPEE)
15. UPPER FUSE. LONGERONS
16. TANK TOP PANELS
17. BATTERY COMPARTWEIfT
18. BULKHEAD 227.25 (LUGS)
19. L/H KEEL INSTALL.
20. R/H KEEL INSTALL.
21. EJJGINE BAY DOORS
22. LANDING GEAR DOCRS
23. LOWER SKIN-W.S. 65
24. IWP LOWER SKIN-W.F. BOX
25. IWP SLAT GROOVE
26. PYLON WIRING
27 . FUEL QUANTITY FEEDTHROUGHS
28. L/H LEADING EDGE "BUMP"
29. R/H LEADING EDGE "BUMP"
30. IWP FLAP RIBS
31. IWP TRAILING EDGE
32. WINGFOLD WIRING
33. WINGFOLD HINGE WEB PANELS
3^4. OWP LOWER SKIN-W.F. BOX
35. OWP SLAT GROOVE
36. OWP FLAP RIBS
37. CWP TRAIUNG EDGE
38. FIXED TAILPIPE FAIRING P
39. EXTEN. EQUIPMENT PLATFORM
i40. BULKHEAD ^451. 5 (LOWER)
41. BULKHEAD 451.5 (UPPER)
42. TAILHOOK TROUGH
43. HORIZ. STAB INSTALLATION
44. STABILIZER WIPE AREA
45. RUDDER HINGES










































































































E - DELAMINATO (1-5)
F - CCRHDDED SOTJCIUREd-S)
G - BUCKLED
H - LOOSE (WRN)
I - LOOSE CFAILEE STSUCTURE
J - SCRATCHED (1-5)
K - TEMPORARY REPAIR
L - PREVIOUS REPAIR (DEPOT)
M - CRACKED (1-5)
N - UOSE FASTBhEIS
- WORN SURFACE




T - CHAFJD UNES
U - CORRODED CONNECTORS
V - awadL/DETEUORATD INSUUTIO.'
W - DETERIORATED SEALS
X - OPTICAL DirroPTior;
Y - VISIBIUTY OBSTRUCTION
Z - NO DISOlEPANCf
gTECT MODIFIg^ CCOES
1 - SEVIPE CONDITION. UNSALVAGEASIE
2 - RB3U1RES ENGINEERED DEPOT RIPAIP.
3 - REajiRES Roy^^E depct repai?.
4 - rehuires organizational repair





























































































A-6 ASPA SCORE SHEET
INSPECTION DATE: T/M/S: BUNO:
Defect Weighted Points
Rank Evaluation Item Col;
01 MAINTENANCE RECORD REVIEW
02 NOSE RADOME
03 INTAKE DUCT FIBERGLASS
04 SPLITTER BOARDS
05 INTAKE DUCT
06 BOARDING LADDER LATCHES
07 CANOPY GLASS
08 WINDSHIELDS




13 AC/rc RELAY BOX
14. BULKHEAD 227.25 (UPPER)
15 UPPER FUSELAGE LONGERSONS
16 TANK TOP PANELS
17 BATTERY COMPARTMENT
18 BULKHEAD 227.25 (LUGS)
19 L/H KEEL INSTALLATION
20 R/H KEEL INSTALLATION
21 ENGINE BAY DOORS
22 LANDING GEAR DOORS
23 LOWER SKIN-W.S. 65
24 IWP LOWER SKIN-W.F. BOX
25 IWP SLAT GROOVE
26 PYLON WIRING
27 FUEL QUANTITY FEEDTHROUGHS
28 L/H LEADING EDGE "BUMP"
29 R/H LEADING EDGE "BUMP"
30 IWP FLAP RIBS
31 IWP TRAILING EDGE
32 WINCFOLD WIRING
33 WINGFOLD SHEAR PANELS
34 OWP LOWER SKIN-W.F. BOX
35 OWP SLAT GROOVE
36 OWP FLAP RIBS
37 OWP TRAILING EDGE
38 FIXED TAILPIPE FAIRING
39 EXTEN. DaUIPMENT PLATFORM
40 BULKHEAD 451.5 (LOWER)
41 BULKHEAD 451.5 (UPPER)
42 TAILHOOK TROUGH
43 HORIZ. STAB INSTALLATION
44 STABILIZER WIPE AREA
45 RUDDER HINGES
46 VERTICAL FIN BASE
47 PAINT CONDITION
48 OVERALL CONDITION
1 2 3 4 5 6 score
7 5 3 2






12 10 7 5 2
9 7 4 2
6 5 4 3 2 1
6 5 4 2 1
7 5 3 2
8 6 4 2
45 34 22 17
38 32 25 19 13 6
29 23 17 13 6
17 13 8 4
11 8 5 3
10 8 6 4 2
6 4 3 1
18 14 9 4
16 12 8 4
15 11 7 4
















11 8 5 3

























7 5 3 2
6 5 4 3 2 1
5 4 3 2 1 1
9 7 4 2
5 4 2 1
6 4 3 1
33 26 20 13 7
26 21 16 10 5
20
13 11 9 6 4 2
71 53 35 18






Aircraft is recommended for one year adjustment to PED.
I I








A-6 AIRCRAFT SERVICE PERIOD ADJUSTMENT (ASPA) CRITERIA
1. A-6 ASPA is based on a relatively cursory inspection which looks for
leading indicators of overall aircraft condition. Implicit in this
approach is the realization that correction of leading indicator
discrepancies does not improve the overall material condition of the
aircraft. In other words, the aircraft should be judged suitable, or not
suitable, for PED adjustment without assumptions that discrepancies
identified by the ASPA evaluation will be corrected or even arrested.
There are, however, two discrepancy categories found dxiring ASPA
evaluations for which the controlling custodian may request depot
assistance:
a. Genuine Critical Discrepancies: By definition, critical
discrepancies place an aircraft in a non-flying status regardless
which maintenance level activity is required. Obviously, such
discrepancies must be corrected before the aircraft can be
routinely operated again, whether or not PED adjustment is
indicated.
b. Depot Major Discrepancies Not Indicative of Overal 1 Aircraft
Condition: Discrepancies such as cracking damage of the tailhook
well can occur at any time in the A-6E's service period and are
not individually indicative of the aircraft's overall condition.
Such discrepancies can be handled in the same manner as they would
be during a regular P & E evaluation (providing they are isolated
in nature).
2. A list of A-6 typical leading indicators would include, but not be
limited to the following types of discrepancies:
• a. Paint deterioration evidenced by light, but widespread, corrosion
attack on the aircraft skin.
• b. Corrosion or cracking of the wing leading edge slat groove.
• c. Intergranular corrosion of the cockpit deck.
d. Noticeable looseness or play in the horizontal stabilizer
installation.
e. Extensive corrosion/cracking of stabilizer sweep areas on aft
fuselage skin.
f. Repeated, intermittent problems with flight
controls, environmental control system, or landing
gear system.
g. Major de lamination and/or corrosion of honeycomb assemblies such




• h. Intergranular corrosion of any primary structure such as wing
planks, longerons, flap support ribs, bulkheads, machined attach
fittings, wingfold shear webs, etc.
* Discrepancies are considered noteworthy. Refer to paragraph M.C.
Evaluation of these types of discrepancies as indicators must include
consideration not only of their present severity, but also the degradation
which may be anticipated during the adjusted service period. In
forecasting the amount of addition degradation which may be expected, the P
& E should assume that the environmental, operational, and maintenance
effects which are evident on the aircraft will continue. It is not
realistic to expect that the degradation trends will be halted or reversed
by the custodian as a reaction to the ASPA evaluation report.
3. Some examples of discrepancies which may not be indicative of overall
aircraft condition but which the custodian may desire to have addressed
are:
a. Isolated cracking intake duct inner skins.
b. Excessive wear of boarding ladder latch.
c. Worn rudder hinges/ linkage.
d. Badly scratched/crazed pilot's windscreen.
e. Isolated cracking of fuselage skin in stabilizer sweep area.
f. Cracks in tailhook well.
Evaluation of these types of discrepancies as "non-indicators" is valid
only if they exist as isolated discrepancies on an otherwise non-discrepant
aircraft. For this reason, they are included as part of the composite
quantitative process since in combination with other discrepancies, they
can indeed indicate that the overall aircraft condition is not suitable for
adjustment.
M. In making a decision to recanmend a service period adjustment, the
following information is provided for perspective:
a. The objective of determining that aircraft will not be a safety,
maintenance, readiness, or economic casualty during an adjustment requires
that an aircraft be in very good condition at the time of the evaluation.
The discrepancies seen during the evaluation with paint and sealant intact
should be minor indeed if the aircraft is to be operated for up to 21
months after the evaluation and yet be economically reworked at depot. An
aircraft may, in fact, have no major or critical depot defects at the time
of the evaluation and still not be suitable for adjustment. An aircraft
which does not merit a recommendation for period adjustment does not
represent a failure on anyone's part; it is simply a normal aircraft which





b. Even though custodians may choose to have Depot correct
discrepancies discovered during the ASPA evaluation, a
recanraendation for service period adjustment should not assume
correction of any defects which are leading indicators. The
objective is to reconmend adjustment only if justified by the
current material condition. If the aircraft requires significant
man-hours and out of service time to correct depot level
discrepancies, it is probably not an appropriate aircraft for
service p^eriod adjustment. The evaluator should be extremely
wary of an aircraft which exhibits depot defects requiring more
than 250 man-4iours or 10 workdays to correct.
c. The discrepancies identified with an asterisk in paragraph 2. are
considered particularly noteworthy since this class of
discrepancy normal ly does not occur as an isolated case on just
one portion of the aircraft. One or more discrepancies of this
nature are a clear indication that the aircraft should not be
adjusted.
d. A correlation of point scores with adjustment results during
initial evaluation of the quantitative method used in this
document demonstrated that an aircraft with over approximately
300 points should not be considered a viable candidate for
adjustment. Below 300 points, the merits of the specific
discrepancies must still be considered, and the adjustment
decision can still go in either direction. This premise is
particularly true if noteworthy discrepancies are discovered
which are not covered in the quantitative evaluation.
5. In summary, ASPA should determine if an aircraft is suitable for
adjustment essentially as is. The depth of examination is not intended,
and is not adequate, for determining what rework is necessary to make an
aircraft suitable for PED adjustment. A list of all discrepancies found is
provided to the custodian for information- Since the aircraft is evaluated
without extensive disassembly and without stripping of paint and sealant
systems, the level of discrepancies found during the evaluation should be




Although the evaluation procedure lists 48 specific tasks, it is
desired that while the opportunity exists in an ASPA evaluation, all major
and critical discrepancies be recorded. Discrepancies not addressed by the
point system are still important in the adjustment decision, and are of
considerable interest to the aircraft custodian. General guidance is
provided below for types of discrepancies which should be recorded during
the evaluation:
Transparent Assemblies: Scratches, cracks, crazing, de lamination,
defective sealant and seals, cracks in frames, corrosion, mechanical
damage, and security.
Mechanical Linkages and Actuating Mechanisms: Cracks, corrosion, evidence
of improper alignment and adjustment: bearings for wear, prof>er
lubrication; evidence of interference/chafing, damage and security; and
proper installation of rod end locking keys and tab washers.
Control Cables and Flexible Shafts: Corrosion, fraying, chafing, kinks,
untwisting, broken strands/wires, evidence of improper alignment, rigging
and tension, security and lubrication.
Pulleys, Fairleads, pressure sea 1 s , rubstrips, cable end fittings and
conduits: Evidence of excessive wear, improper alignment, and adjustment,
damage and security.
Flexible Hoses: Fraying, chafing, twisting, deterioration, proper routing
and security, and evidence of leakage.
Tubing and Ducting: Cracks, corrosion and security, evidence of leakage,
scorching adjacent to bleed air ducts, bellows distortion, and proper
installation.
Electrical /Electronic Equip«nent: Evidence of overheating; corrosion,
proper bonding and security; defective vibration danpeners; corroded or
damaged pins (when disconnected), terminals and connectors, lockwiring,
condition of junction boxes, conduits/tubing and legibility of essential
markings
.
Wiring and Wiring Components: Evidence of overheating; chafing, kinking,
fraying, deterioration, fluid damage and proper routing; splices, terminals
and connectors for damaged pins and deteriorated potting (when
disconnected); security, and proper clamping.
Instruments: Evidence of overheating of electrical units; damaged
faceplates, interface with moving parts, condition/security of units and
attaching wiring, hoses and tubing.
Genera 1
:
Security, cracks, corrosion, damage, distortion, deformation,
interface alignment, evidence of overheating or leakage, broken or missing
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c.l An analysis of P-3
Aircraft Service Period
Adjustment criteria.

